同行的负收入会让Stifle公司的社会责任感到意外吗?

IF 7.4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Rong Gong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了竞争对手公司的负面盈利意外对焦点公司企业社会责任(CSR)投资的影响。我的理论是,竞争对手公司的负面盈利意外会吸引焦点公司股东更强烈的监督,从而暴露焦点公司的短期压力,使其限制对社会责任活动的投资。我发现,竞争对手公司的负面盈利意外会降低公司的企业社会责任参与度,而当焦点公司的财务业绩较差、市场不确定性较低、出现负面盈利意外的竞争对手公司获得更多的媒体报道和更一致的新闻基调时,这种影响会更大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do peers’ negative earnings surprises Stifle corporate social responsibility?

This study examines the effects of rival firms' negative earnings surprises on focal firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment. I theorize that rival firms' negative earnings surprises attract stronger scrutiny by shareholders in the focal firm, which exposes short-term pressure on the focal firm and makes it limit investments in socially responsible activities. I find that rival firms' negative earnings surprises decrease a firm's CSR engagement, and the effects are stronger when the focal firm has poorer financial performance, when market uncertainty is lower, and when rival firms that experience negative earnings surprises receive a greater amount of media coverage and more consistent news tone.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
13.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: Long Range Planning (LRP) is an internationally renowned journal specializing in the field of strategic management. Since its establishment in 1968, the journal has consistently published original research, garnering a strong reputation among academics. LRP actively encourages the submission of articles that involve empirical research and theoretical perspectives, including studies that provide critical assessments and analysis of the current state of knowledge in crucial strategic areas. The primary user base of LRP primarily comprises individuals from academic backgrounds, with the journal playing a dual role within this community. Firstly, it serves as a platform for the dissemination of research findings among academic researchers. Secondly, it serves as a channel for the transmission of ideas that can be effectively utilized in educational settings. The articles published in LRP cater to a diverse audience, including practicing managers and students in professional programs. While some articles may focus on practical applications, others may primarily target academic researchers. LRP adopts an inclusive approach to empirical research, accepting studies that draw on various methodologies such as primary survey data, archival data, case studies, and recognized approaches to data collection.
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