{"title":"《形而上学导论》","authors":"G. Feis","doi":"10.1515/jso-2017-0001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One might wonder why a social ontologist should care about metametaphysics and read an introduction to the topic such as the one written by Tuomas E. Tahko. Answering the question requires to take stance on some substantial disputes about social ontology and its methods. Before making some of these general remarks, let us focus on the book. Tahko’s Introduction, though not interested in historical questions, follows a chronological order in presenting the topics of metametaphysics. After an introduction on why we should care about metametaphysics (ch. 1), we start with the Carnap-Quine debate (ch. 2) before focusing on ontological commitment and its alternatives (ch. 3). These chapters allow us to distinguish the three main positions in the contemporary metametaphysics debate (ch. 4): Quiniean views, NeoAristotelian views, and deflationists views – further divided along the realist vs. anti-realist axis. After setting the stage and explaining how we arrived at the current state of the art, the book presents the main contemporary topics of metametaphysics: grounding and ontological dependence (ch. 5), levels of reality and fundamentality (ch. 6). Then the book adds something in the last three chapters to the standard view of (meta)metaphysics, as Tahko is convinced that some (modal) epistemological issues are deeply entrenched with metametaphysics. The issues discussed are the status – a priori or a posteriori? – of metaphysics (ch. 7), the role of intuitions and thought experiments in metaphysics (ch. 8) and the relationships between metaphysics and science (ch. 9). A clearly written glossary, a bibliography and indexes (names and concepts) finish the volume, which targets both graduate students and experts in philosophy whose main interests lie outside metametaphysics. Now it is time to get into the book and produce some spoilers about it. First, the book is written by a Neo-Aristotelian: Tahko is clear in stating his background credo but struggles to remain neutral in presenting the issues. His background","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"3 1","pages":"129 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2017-0001","citationCount":"25","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Introduction to Metametaphysics\",\"authors\":\"G. 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These chapters allow us to distinguish the three main positions in the contemporary metametaphysics debate (ch. 4): Quiniean views, NeoAristotelian views, and deflationists views – further divided along the realist vs. anti-realist axis. After setting the stage and explaining how we arrived at the current state of the art, the book presents the main contemporary topics of metametaphysics: grounding and ontological dependence (ch. 5), levels of reality and fundamentality (ch. 6). Then the book adds something in the last three chapters to the standard view of (meta)metaphysics, as Tahko is convinced that some (modal) epistemological issues are deeply entrenched with metametaphysics. The issues discussed are the status – a priori or a posteriori? – of metaphysics (ch. 7), the role of intuitions and thought experiments in metaphysics (ch. 8) and the relationships between metaphysics and science (ch. 9). A clearly written glossary, a bibliography and indexes (names and concepts) finish the volume, which targets both graduate students and experts in philosophy whose main interests lie outside metametaphysics. Now it is time to get into the book and produce some spoilers about it. First, the book is written by a Neo-Aristotelian: Tahko is clear in stating his background credo but struggles to remain neutral in presenting the issues. 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One might wonder why a social ontologist should care about metametaphysics and read an introduction to the topic such as the one written by Tuomas E. Tahko. Answering the question requires to take stance on some substantial disputes about social ontology and its methods. Before making some of these general remarks, let us focus on the book. Tahko’s Introduction, though not interested in historical questions, follows a chronological order in presenting the topics of metametaphysics. After an introduction on why we should care about metametaphysics (ch. 1), we start with the Carnap-Quine debate (ch. 2) before focusing on ontological commitment and its alternatives (ch. 3). These chapters allow us to distinguish the three main positions in the contemporary metametaphysics debate (ch. 4): Quiniean views, NeoAristotelian views, and deflationists views – further divided along the realist vs. anti-realist axis. After setting the stage and explaining how we arrived at the current state of the art, the book presents the main contemporary topics of metametaphysics: grounding and ontological dependence (ch. 5), levels of reality and fundamentality (ch. 6). Then the book adds something in the last three chapters to the standard view of (meta)metaphysics, as Tahko is convinced that some (modal) epistemological issues are deeply entrenched with metametaphysics. The issues discussed are the status – a priori or a posteriori? – of metaphysics (ch. 7), the role of intuitions and thought experiments in metaphysics (ch. 8) and the relationships between metaphysics and science (ch. 9). A clearly written glossary, a bibliography and indexes (names and concepts) finish the volume, which targets both graduate students and experts in philosophy whose main interests lie outside metametaphysics. Now it is time to get into the book and produce some spoilers about it. First, the book is written by a Neo-Aristotelian: Tahko is clear in stating his background credo but struggles to remain neutral in presenting the issues. His background