流动性约束下的采掘权配置

IF 2.6 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Jorge Holzer, Kenneth McConnell
{"title":"流动性约束下的采掘权配置","authors":"Jorge Holzer,&nbsp;Kenneth McConnell","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2022.101345","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the optimal allocation of a resource in a second-best world in which parties may be liquidity-constrained due to credit frictions and capital market imperfections. In this setting, common to various natural resource industries, agents are unable to bid more than their budget regardless of their valuation. While auction markets are widely used mechanisms for allocating natural resource extraction rights and conservation contracts, we show that in these circumstances the competitive market –which allocates items based on rank order of bids– fails to achieve the first-best allocation. The market outcome is welfare-dominated by a hybrid mechanism consisting of random assignment followed by resale in a secondary market. Via the initial lottery, the hybrid-mechanism allocates the items with positive probability to high-valuation low-wealth individuals who would not have been able to afford them in a competitive market. High-valuation high-wealth agents, on the other hand, acquire the items in the secondary market if they do not receive them in the initial lottery. Therefore, equity in the allocation of access to the resource may be justified not only by distributional concerns but also by economic efficiency. We illustrate our model using data from buybacks of harvesting rights in the seafood industry.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"71 ","pages":"Article 101345"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints\",\"authors\":\"Jorge Holzer,&nbsp;Kenneth McConnell\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2022.101345\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We study the optimal allocation of a resource in a second-best world in which parties may be liquidity-constrained due to credit frictions and capital market imperfections. In this setting, common to various natural resource industries, agents are unable to bid more than their budget regardless of their valuation. While auction markets are widely used mechanisms for allocating natural resource extraction rights and conservation contracts, we show that in these circumstances the competitive market –which allocates items based on rank order of bids– fails to achieve the first-best allocation. The market outcome is welfare-dominated by a hybrid mechanism consisting of random assignment followed by resale in a secondary market. Via the initial lottery, the hybrid-mechanism allocates the items with positive probability to high-valuation low-wealth individuals who would not have been able to afford them in a competitive market. High-valuation high-wealth agents, on the other hand, acquire the items in the secondary market if they do not receive them in the initial lottery. Therefore, equity in the allocation of access to the resource may be justified not only by distributional concerns but also by economic efficiency. We illustrate our model using data from buybacks of harvesting rights in the seafood industry.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47952,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Resource and Energy Economics\",\"volume\":\"71 \",\"pages\":\"Article 101345\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Resource and Energy Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765522000628\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Resource and Energy Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765522000628","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了第二好世界中资源的最优配置,在这个世界中,各方可能由于信贷摩擦和资本市场的不完善而受到流动性约束。在这种情况下,各种自然资源行业都很常见,无论估价如何,代理商都无法出价超过预算。虽然拍卖市场是分配自然资源开采权和保护合同的广泛使用的机制,但我们表明,在这种情况下,竞争性市场——根据出价的排名顺序分配项目——无法实现第一最佳分配。市场结果是福利由一种混合机制主导,该机制由随机分配和在二级市场转售组成。通过最初的彩票,混合机制将具有正概率的物品分配给在竞争激烈的市场中无法负担的高估值低财富个人。另一方面,如果高估值高财富代理人在最初的彩票中没有收到这些物品,他们就会在二级市场上获得这些物品。因此,公平分配获得资源的机会不仅可以从分配方面考虑,还可以从经济效率方面考虑。我们使用海鲜行业收割权回购的数据来说明我们的模型。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints

We study the optimal allocation of a resource in a second-best world in which parties may be liquidity-constrained due to credit frictions and capital market imperfections. In this setting, common to various natural resource industries, agents are unable to bid more than their budget regardless of their valuation. While auction markets are widely used mechanisms for allocating natural resource extraction rights and conservation contracts, we show that in these circumstances the competitive market –which allocates items based on rank order of bids– fails to achieve the first-best allocation. The market outcome is welfare-dominated by a hybrid mechanism consisting of random assignment followed by resale in a secondary market. Via the initial lottery, the hybrid-mechanism allocates the items with positive probability to high-valuation low-wealth individuals who would not have been able to afford them in a competitive market. High-valuation high-wealth agents, on the other hand, acquire the items in the secondary market if they do not receive them in the initial lottery. Therefore, equity in the allocation of access to the resource may be justified not only by distributional concerns but also by economic efficiency. We illustrate our model using data from buybacks of harvesting rights in the seafood industry.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Resource and Energy Economics provides a forum for high level economic analysis of utilization and development of the earth natural resources. The subject matter encompasses questions of optimal production and consumption affecting energy, minerals, land, air and water, and includes analysis of firm and industry behavior, environmental issues and public policies. Implications for both developed and developing countries are of concern. The journal publishes high quality papers for an international audience. Innovative energy, resource and environmental analyses, including theoretical models and empirical studies are appropriate for publication in Resource and Energy Economics.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信