开发成功的基于自主的计划:基于注意力的观点

IF 5.7 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Andrew Cavanagh, Paul Kalfadellis, Susan Freeman
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引用次数: 6

摘要

采用公司的注意力基础观点作为我们的主要理论视角,我们探讨了子公司在开发成功的假设的基于自主的举措时吸引或避免总部注意的机制。为此,我们的研究在多案例研究设计中利用了来自子公司和总部的定性数据。我们的研究表明,子公司首先不披露假设的基于自主的举措,以避免总部的负面关注。然后,我们强调子公司进行主动销售以吸引总部积极关注的方式;特别是,我们确定了可证明的财务成功和企业一致性的独特销售标准。最后,我们揭示了时机在平衡不披露和主动出售的竞争双重要求方面的重要性。我们的论文旨在探讨子公司吸引或避免总部关注的机制,以确保其主动、自主的行动有助于在跨国公司中发挥更大的作用。我们在这里强调了对子公司经理特别重要的三种机制。首先,我们发现子公司最初“不披露”这些行为是为了避免总部的负面关注。其次,我们发现子公司最终希望展示其自主行动的财务成功和企业一致性。最后,我们强调在平衡不披露要求和向总部“推销”子公司行为的时机的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Developing successful assumed autonomy-based initiatives: An attention-based view

Research Summary

Adopting the attention-based view of the firm as our principal theoretical lens, we explore the mechanisms by which subsidiaries attract or avoid headquarters attention in developing successful assumed autonomy-based initiatives. To this end, our study utilizes qualitative data from subsidiary and headquarters perspectives in a multiple case study design. Our study reveals that subsidiaries first engage in non-disclosure of assumed autonomy-based initiatives to avoid negative headquarters attention. We then highlight the way in which subsidiaries undertake initiative selling to attract positive headquarters attention; in particular, we identify the unique selling criteria of demonstrable financial success and corporate alignment. Finally, we reveal the importance of timing in balancing the competing dual requirements of non-disclosure and initiative selling.

Managerial Summary

Our paper aims to explore the mechanisms by which subsidiaries attract or avoid attention from headquarters, to ensure that their proactive, autonomous actions facilitate the attainment of an extended role within the MNE. We highlight three mechanisms as especially important here for subsidiary managers. First, we reveal that subsidiaries initially engage in “non-disclosure” of these actions to avoid negative headquarters attention. Second, we discover that subsidiaries ultimately look to demonstrate the financial success and corporate alignment of their autonomous actions. Finally, we emphasize the importance of timing in balancing the requirements of non-disclosure and the “selling” of the subsidiary's actions to headquarters.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.
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