ADA Protection of Transgender Rights

The Illinois Supreme Court allowed Mr. H.’s petition for leave to appeal and examined whether Mr. H. had been inappropriately administered involuntary medication under § 2-107.1 of the Mental Health Code. Although the 90-day involuntary treatment order had expired before the appeal, the court agreed to review the case under the same mootness exceptions cited by the apellate court. Mr. H. did not dispute that the procedural protocol had been appropriately followed. Rather, he contended that the Powers of Attorney Law broadly provided his agent authority to make all medical decisions, including the right to refuse psychotropic medications on his behalf. As he had delegated his decision-making authority to his agent, and his agent declined treatment on his behalf, there was no basis by which an involuntary medication order could be filed in the first place. Mr. H. concluded that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the state’s petition seeking involuntary treatment. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that as the statute contained the disjunctive “or,” it indicated two independent alternatives. Involuntary treatment may be administered either with the consent of the health care agent appointed under the Powers of Attorney Law or involuntarily under § 2-107.1 of the Mental Health Code. The court also observed that § 2-107.1 refers to health care power of attorney repeatedly, requires attachment of an existing and available power of attorney to the petition, and provides for notice of the proceedings to the health care agent. Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that all of these provisions would be “nonsensical” if the existence of the power of attorney required dismissal of the petition. The Illinois Supreme Court also stated that, when there are multiple statutes relating to the same subject, the presumption is that they are intended to be consistent and harmonious. If they appear to conflict, then they should be construed in harmony if reasonably possible. If it is not possible, then more recently enacted statutes supersede earlier ones and more specific statutes supersede general ones. Regarding the Powers of Attorney Law and the Mental Health Code statutes relevant to this case, the statutes could be interpreted in harmony. Specifically, the language of § 2-107.1 demonstrates a clear legislative intent for the Mental Health Code to act as a narrow exception to the health care agent’s authority to make health care decisions. Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that even if the statutes could not be construed in harmony, the Mental Health Code would still apply as it is the more recent and more specific provision.