{"title":"WIC婴儿配方奶粉回扣计划中的溢出机制","authors":"C. Rojas, Hongli Wei","doi":"10.1515/jafio-2018-0019","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper explores the WIC infant formula rebate program, which awards a single-source contract to the firm that offers the lowest net bid price. We study spillover mechanisms derived from instances when an infant formula manufacturer displaces another as a WIC supplier. The analysis compares three types of product segments: infant formula (where WIC is the main player), non-WIC infant formula, and toddler formula. We find that, immediately after the contract displacement, there is a significant increase in market share for all three types of formula for the winning manufacturer and that this effect increases overtime. These market share effects are likely explained by greater shelf space, better product placement, and the advantages of carrying WIC labels, as well as by a combined impact of recommendations from physicians and WIC participants. More interestingly, we observe that winning manufacturers increase the price of WIC and non-WIC infant formula over time. Back-of-the-envelope calculations show that the profit that the WIC-contract manufacturer derives from these spillovers in other product segments more than dominates the losses associated to selling the WIC product below cost. We also discuss the implications that the spillover effects have on displaced (former WIC) manufacturers.","PeriodicalId":52541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jafio-2018-0019","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Spillover Mechanisms in the WIC Infant Formula Rebate Program\",\"authors\":\"C. Rojas, Hongli Wei\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/jafio-2018-0019\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper explores the WIC infant formula rebate program, which awards a single-source contract to the firm that offers the lowest net bid price. We study spillover mechanisms derived from instances when an infant formula manufacturer displaces another as a WIC supplier. The analysis compares three types of product segments: infant formula (where WIC is the main player), non-WIC infant formula, and toddler formula. We find that, immediately after the contract displacement, there is a significant increase in market share for all three types of formula for the winning manufacturer and that this effect increases overtime. These market share effects are likely explained by greater shelf space, better product placement, and the advantages of carrying WIC labels, as well as by a combined impact of recommendations from physicians and WIC participants. More interestingly, we observe that winning manufacturers increase the price of WIC and non-WIC infant formula over time. Back-of-the-envelope calculations show that the profit that the WIC-contract manufacturer derives from these spillovers in other product segments more than dominates the losses associated to selling the WIC product below cost. We also discuss the implications that the spillover effects have on displaced (former WIC) manufacturers.\",\"PeriodicalId\":52541,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-12-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jafio-2018-0019\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/jafio-2018-0019\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Business, Management and Accounting\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jafio-2018-0019","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Business, Management and Accounting","Score":null,"Total":0}
Spillover Mechanisms in the WIC Infant Formula Rebate Program
Abstract This paper explores the WIC infant formula rebate program, which awards a single-source contract to the firm that offers the lowest net bid price. We study spillover mechanisms derived from instances when an infant formula manufacturer displaces another as a WIC supplier. The analysis compares three types of product segments: infant formula (where WIC is the main player), non-WIC infant formula, and toddler formula. We find that, immediately after the contract displacement, there is a significant increase in market share for all three types of formula for the winning manufacturer and that this effect increases overtime. These market share effects are likely explained by greater shelf space, better product placement, and the advantages of carrying WIC labels, as well as by a combined impact of recommendations from physicians and WIC participants. More interestingly, we observe that winning manufacturers increase the price of WIC and non-WIC infant formula over time. Back-of-the-envelope calculations show that the profit that the WIC-contract manufacturer derives from these spillovers in other product segments more than dominates the losses associated to selling the WIC product below cost. We also discuss the implications that the spillover effects have on displaced (former WIC) manufacturers.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization (JAFIO) is a unique forum for empirical and theoretical research in industrial organization with a special focus on agricultural and food industries worldwide. As concentration, industrialization, and globalization continue to reshape horizontal and vertical relationships within the food supply chain, agricultural economists are revising both their views of traditional markets as well as their tools of analysis. At the core of this revision are strategic interactions between principals and agents, strategic interdependence between rival firms, and strategic trade policy between competing nations, all in a setting plagued by incomplete and/or imperfect information structures. Add to that biotechnology, electronic commerce, as well as the shift in focus from raw agricultural commodities to branded products, and the conclusion is that a "new" agricultural economics is needed for an increasingly complex "new" agriculture.