债务政策、机构所有权、公司价值和资产利用是印度尼西亚制造业公司的干预变量

D. Lestari, M. Rahayu
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引用次数: 1

摘要

所有者和管理层之间的职能分离会产生代理冲突,管理者的决定不一定与所有者一致。经理不再把所有者的利益置于个人利益之上。作为内部人的管理层有效地控制着公司,比作为外部人的所有者了解更多的信息。在亚洲国家,多数所有权倾向于控制管理。因此,发生的代理冲突不再纯粹是管理者和资本所有者之间的冲突,而是大股东和小股东之间的冲突。这种管理制度允许大股东对少数股东进行征用。需要控制机制来抑制公司内部存在的代理冲突,以便股东仍然优先于经理的个人利益。本研究使用了2013-2016年在印度尼西亚证券交易所上市的123家制造业公司的样本。研究结果表明,债务对资产利用率和公司价值具有显著的负向影响。而机构所有权对资产利用率和公司价值有显著的正向影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Debt Policy, Institutional Ownership, Company Values, and Assets Utilization as Intervening Variables in Manufacturing Companies in Indonesia
Separation of functions between owners and management creates agency conflicts where the manager's decision is not necessarily in line with the owner. The manager no longer prioritizes the interests of the owner over his personal interests. Management as an insider effectively controls the company and knows more information than the owner as an outsider. In Asian countries, there is a tendency for majority ownership to take control in management. So that the agency conflict that occurs is no longer pure between managers and capital owners, but between majority and minority shareholders. This management system allows for expropriation by majority shareholders against minorities. The control mechanism is needed to suppress agency conflicts that exist within the company so that shareholders remain prioritized over the manager's personal interests.This study uses a sample of 123 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2016. The results of the study show that debt has a significant negative effect on the utilization of assets and company value. While institutional ownership has a significant positive effect on asset utilization and company value.
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