医生是更好的卫生部长吗？

IF 3.1 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Journal of Health Economics Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI:10.1086/710331

Adam Pilny, Felix Roesel

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引用次数: 6

摘要

任命或选举专业人士担任公职人员是一把双刃剑。专家可以利用他们丰富的知识来实施改革，但他们也可以支持自己的职业。在这项研究中，我们比较了1955年至2017年间德国受过医生培训的州卫生部长与其他职业的部长。德国国家卫生部长拥有决定医院容量和基础设施的巨大权力。我们的研究结果表明，经过医生培训的卫生部长通过法定健康保险（SHI）增加了医院的容量、资本和资金。这促使医院雇佣更多的医生，但对医院产出的影响很小。因此，在医生部长的领导下，医院护理的全要素生产率（TFP）增长大幅放缓。同时，医院医生的工作满意度也呈上升趋势。我们得出的结论是，医学界尤其受益于在职医生。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Are Doctors Better Health Ministers?

Appointing or electing professionals to be public officials is a double-edged sword. Experts can use their rich knowledge to implement reforms, but they can also favor their own profession. In this study, we compare physician-trained state health ministers to ministers of other professions in Germany during 1955–2017. German state health ministers have great power to determine hospital capacities and infrastructure. Our results show that physician-trained health ministers increase hospital capacities, capital, and funding by the statutory health insurance (SHI). This prompts hospitals to hire more physicians, but with little impact on hospital outputs. As a result, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in hospital care slows down substantially under physician-ministers. At the same time, job satisfaction of hospital doctors tends to increase. We conclude that, in particular, the medical profession benefits from medical doctors in office.

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来源期刊

American Journal of Health Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

4.30

自引率

2.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： The American Journal of Health Economics (AJHE) provides a forum for the in-depth analysis of health care markets and individual health behaviors. The articles appearing in AJHE are authored by scholars from universities, private research organizations, government, and industry. Subjects of interest include competition among private insurers, hospitals, and physicians; impacts of public insurance programs, including the Affordable Care Act; pharmaceutical innovation and regulation; medical device supply; the rise of obesity and its consequences; the influence and growth of aging populations; and much more.