失而复得的虚无主义:Brassier、Jonas和Nishitani谈拥抱和/或克服虚无主义

IF 0.3 0 PHILOSOPHY
Andrea Lehner, Felipe Cuervo Restrepo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文将雷·布雷西耶对虚无主义的辩护与汉斯·乔纳斯和西谷Keiji的两种重要但经常被忽视的克服虚无主义的哲学尝试进行比较。通过将这些对虚无主义的不同看法放入对话中,它探索了布拉西耶立场中的一些盲点,以及他的激进虚无主义导致的规范与自然之间的激进分离对我们当前星球状况的一些实际后果。本文选择了对虚无主义的一种更温和的接受和最终的自我克服,据此,即使自然实体对人类的原因和意义漠不关心,这并不意味着自然失去了独立于人类的规范维度。换句话说,这篇文章认为,必须注意不要把对人类中心主义的理由和意义概念的批评与认为意义完全不存在于自然界的观点混为一谈。因此,本文的中心论点是,鉴于我们当前的气候和生态灾难,当代哲学最紧迫的任务之一是以非人类中心主义的方式理解规范性,这样人类就不再被认为是对规范性做出反应的唯一实体。这种态度认为人类是在一个毫无意义、冷漠的自然世界中被疏远的规范生物,他们对这个世界没有伦理责任。文章最后提出了一些方法来发展一种不落入道德真空的解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Nihilism Lost and Found: Brassier, Jonas, and Nishitani on Embracing and/or Overcoming Nihilism
Abstract This essay confronts Ray Brassier’s vindication of nihilism with other two important but frequently underexamined philosophical attempts to overcome nihilism: Hans Jonas’ and Keiji Nishitani’s. By putting these different takes on nihilism into dialogue, it explores some blind spots in Brassier’s position, as well as some of the practical consequences, for our current planetary situation, of undertaking a radical divorce between the normative and the natural that results from his radical nihilism. The article opts for a more moderate acceptance and eventual self-overcoming of nihilism, according to which, even if natural entities are indifferent to human reasons and meanings, this does not entail that nature is bereft of a human-independent normative dimension. In other words, the essay argues that care must be taken not to confuse criticisms of an anthropocentric conception of reasons and meanings with the belief that meaning is completely absent from the natural world. Thus, the central contention of the article is that, given our current climate and ecological catastrophe, one of the most pressing tasks of contemporary philosophy is to understand normativity in non-anthropocentric ways, so that humans are no longer considered as the only entities that respond to normativity. Such an attitude conceives humans as estranged normative creatures amidst a meaningless, indifferent natural world, toward which they would have no ethical responsibilities. The essay finishes by suggesting ways in which to develop an account that does not fall into this ethical vacuum.
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来源期刊
Open Philosophy
Open Philosophy Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
20.00%
发文量
25
审稿时长
15 weeks
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