对诚实的偏好可以支持合作

IF 1.8 3区 心理学 Q3 PSYCHOLOGY, APPLIED
Aron Szekely, David Bruner, Sven Steinmo, Arpad Todor, Clara Volintiru, Giulia Andrighetto
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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多集体行动问题本质上都与诚实有关。通过决定诚实行事,人们为解决集体行动问题做出了贡献。我们使用来自两个地点(n = 331和n = 319)的实验室实验来测试诚实偏好是否可以驱动合作,以及这些偏好是否可以通过框架不同地激活。研究对象以两种不同的处理方式之一参与公共物品博弈的非对称信息变体,这两种处理方式仅在措辞上有所不同:贡献框架使用标准的公共物品博弈框架,而在诚实框架中,使用旨在引发诚实的词语。我们以三种方式测量受试者的诚实度,使用(i)发送-接收任务,(ii)掷骰子任务和(iii)自我报告的诚实度水平,并考虑他人偏好和社会规范,以分离关键的替代动机。我们发现,诚实偏好的所有三种测量方法都能强有力地预测贡献,其他偏好和经验期望也能预测贡献,但规范性期望却不能。此外,诚实偏好预测诚实框架中的贡献,而不是贡献框架中的贡献,尽管两者之间的差异并不总是显著的。最后,我们发现不同处理之间的平均合作没有差异。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Preferences for honesty can support cooperation

Preferences for honesty can support cooperation

Many collective action problems are inherently linked to honesty. By deciding to behave honestly, people contribute to solving the collective action problem. We use a laboratory experiment from two sites (n = 331 and n = 319) to test whether honest preferences can drive cooperation and whether these preferences can be differentially activated by framing. Subjects participate in an asymmetric information variant of the public goods game in one of two treatments that vary only in their wording: The Contribution Frame uses a standard public good game framing, while in the Honesty Frame, words aimed to trigger honesty are used. We measure subjects' honesty in three ways using the (i) sender–receiver task, (ii) the die-roll task, and (iii) self-reported honesty levels and account for other-regarding preferences and social norms to disentangle key alternative motives. We find that all three measures of honesty preferences robustly predict contributions, as do other-regarding preferences and empirical expectations but not normative expectations. Additionally, honesty preferences predict contributions in the Honesty Frame but not in the Contribution Frame, although the difference between these is not consistently significant. Finally, we find no differences in average cooperation across the treatments.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
40
期刊介绍: The Journal of Behavioral Decision Making is a multidisciplinary journal with a broad base of content and style. It publishes original empirical reports, critical review papers, theoretical analyses and methodological contributions. The Journal also features book, software and decision aiding technique reviews, abstracts of important articles published elsewhere and teaching suggestions. The objective of the Journal is to present and stimulate behavioral research on decision making and to provide a forum for the evaluation of complementary, contrasting and conflicting perspectives. These perspectives include psychology, management science, sociology, political science and economics. Studies of behavioral decision making in naturalistic and applied settings are encouraged.
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