我们应该做什么:非代理群体的决定和责任

Q2 Arts and Humanities
Olle Blomberg
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在普通语篇中,一个单一的义务常常被归因于多个施动者。斯蒂芬妮·柯林斯在《群体责任:它们的存在及其对个体的影响》一书中声称,这种归因涉及“类别错误”。我批判性地讨论了柯林斯关于这一主张的论点,并认为,在一种实质性意义上,非能动群体可以有道德义务。由于每个人都有能力对他们应该一起做什么进行实际的推理,多个行动者可以有一个单一的责任来产生一个结果。我还认为,柯林斯试图对这种“我们推理”进行简化的解释是失败的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What We Ought to Do: The Decisions and Duties of Non-agential Groups
Abstract In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals, Stephanie Collins claims that such attributions involve a “category error”. I critically discuss Collins’ argument for this claim and argue that there is a substantive sense in which non-agential groups can have moral duties. A plurality of agents can have a single duty to bring about an outcome by virtue of a capacity of each to practically reason about what they ought to do together. I also argue that Collins’ attempt to give a reductive account of such “we-reasoning” fails.
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来源期刊
Journal of Social Ontology
Journal of Social Ontology Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
审稿时长
16 weeks
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