进入、位置和最优环境政策

IF 2.6 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Manuel Estay , John K. Stranlund
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们研究了选择环境法规来控制多边、空间异质性污染外部性的问题。在这个问题上,效率低下有三个原因;公司数量、地点和生产/排放水平。一项最佳政策需要三种工具来解决效率低下的每个根源,但这种政策在大多数情况下都是不切实际的。因此,我们研究了次优政策的相对性能,这些政策最优地控制了一个或两个低效率来源,同时使另一个或两个来源不受控制。由于理论模型的复杂性,我们进行了数值模拟来比较不同的策略。我们发现,最优选择个人配额的政策本身表现很差,因为它们鼓励过度进入。将个人配额与最优进入限制相结合的效果要好得多。单独的空间差别化税收表现非常好,因为它们除了限制污染外,还部分解决了低效率的进入和定位来源。我们还认为,与分区限制或同质税等更简单的政策相关的福利损失可能不够高,不足以证明与理论上更有效的政策相关的额外实施困难。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Entry, location, and optimal environmental policies

We investigate the problem of choosing environmental regulations to control a multilateral, spatially heterogeneous pollution externality. There are three sources of inefficiency in this problem; the number of firms, their locations and their production/emissions levels. A first-best policy requires three instruments to address each of the sources of inefficiency, but such policies are not practical in most settings. Therefore, we examine the relative performance of second-best policies that optimally control one or two of the sources of inefficiency while leaving the other one or two sources uncontrolled. Because of the complexity of our theoretical model, we conduct numerical simulations to compare the alternative policies. We find that a policy of optimally-chosen individual quotas by themselves perform very poorly, because they encourage excessive entry. Combining individual quotas with an optimal entry restriction performs significantly better. Spatially differentiated taxes alone perform very well, because they partially address both the entry and location sources of inefficiency in addition to limiting pollution. We also argue that the welfare losses associated with even simpler policies like zoning restrictions or homogeneous taxes may not be high enough to justify the additional implementation difficulties associated with theoretically more efficient policies.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Resource and Energy Economics provides a forum for high level economic analysis of utilization and development of the earth natural resources. The subject matter encompasses questions of optimal production and consumption affecting energy, minerals, land, air and water, and includes analysis of firm and industry behavior, environmental issues and public policies. Implications for both developed and developing countries are of concern. The journal publishes high quality papers for an international audience. Innovative energy, resource and environmental analyses, including theoretical models and empirical studies are appropriate for publication in Resource and Energy Economics.
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