李贽的对立本体论:对概念矛盾论的一种替代

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
N. Rudenko
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文对理学家李贽(1527-1602)哲学观定义为“对立的本我主义”的关联性进行了论证,其核心特征是以真为最高价值。这种真实性是通过将真实性与非真实性对立起来来定义的。本研究主要以李贽的代表作《焚书》(《分书》)中的73篇文章为基础,并引用《童心释读》(《杂说》)、《杂剧互释》(《何新音论》)、,《论三大圣像》(《三大圣象仪》)、《虚实解》(《续世说》)。值得注意的是,李既批评脱离现实的概念,也批评与他所共有的概念不符的现实因素,这一点尤其可以从《鬼神论》和《四不像说》中看出。此外,文章还批评了当代著名学者(R.HandlerSpitz,LiWai-ye)的一些言论,这些言论与李对儒家经典的态度、情感及其在生活、孝道和殉道等各个领域的表现有关,认为李的观点是有意识的矛盾。有人认为,在当代研究中经常出现的将李贽视为概念矛盾的思想家的倾向,可以解释为学者们对李的文本分析量不足,遵循对过去的刻板评价,以及希望将思想家的观点异国化或赋予其对现代世界的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Li Zhi’s Oppositional Authentism: An Alternative to the Conceptual Contradictionism
The article presents and provides argumentation to the relevancy of definition of Neo-Confucian thinker Li Zhi (1527–1602) philosophical views as “oppositional authentism”, the core feature of which is the perception of genuineness as the highest value. This genuineness is defined through making the opposition of genuine and non-genuine. The research is mostly based on 73 essays from Li Zhi’s opus magnum “A Book to Burn” (Fen-shu) and proved with quotations from such works as «Interpretation of Child-like Heart» (Tong-xin shuo), «Inter­pretation of Diverse [Plays]» (Za-shuo), «Discourse on He Xinyin» (He Xinyin lun), «Preface to the “Analysis of the ‘[Treatise of Teacher] Lao’” by Ziyou» (Ziyou jie-Lao xu), «Discussions on Behalf of Statues of Three Mahasattvas» (San da-shi xiang-yi), «Interpretation of Voidness and Fullness» (Xu-shi shuo). It is noted that Li criticizes as inauthentic both concepts that diverge from reality, and elements of reality that do not correspond to the concepts he shares: which can be seen, in particular, on the example of essays «Discourse on Ghosts and Spirits» (Gui-shen lun) and «Interpretation of the Four Don’ts» (Si wu shuo). Also, the article criticizes some statements of prominent contemporary scholars of the field (R. Handler-Spitz, Li Wai-yee), which are connected with the percep­tion of Li Zhi’s views as consciously contradictional, precisely with Li’s attitude to Confucian canons, emotions and feelings and their manifestations in various spheres of life, filial piety and martyrdom. It is suggested that the tendency to as­certain Li Zhi as conceptually contradictory thinker which is frequently seen in contemporary researches can be explained by the insufficient volume of Li’s texts analyzed by scholars, following stereotypical assessments of the past, as well as the desire to exoticize thinker's views or to endow them with importance for the modern world.
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来源期刊
VOPROSY FILOSOFII
VOPROSY FILOSOFII PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
50.00%
发文量
100
期刊介绍: "Вопросы философии" - академическое научное издание, центральный философский журнал в России. В настоящее время является органом Президиума Российской Академии Наук. Журнал "Вопросы философии" исторически тесно связан с Институтом философии РАН. Выходит ежемесячно. Журнал был основан в июле 1947 г. Интернет-версия журнала запущена в мае 2009 года.
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