延伸威慑战略:国家如何提供安全保护伞

IF 2.2 2区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Do Young Lee
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引用次数: 5

摘要

核主顾有哪些扩展威慑策略?哪些因素决定了他们采用哪种策略?每种策略如何表现为强制雇佣?大部分关于扩展威慑的文献都集中在其有效性上。然而,核保护人如何选择和使用延伸威慑战略的问题在很大程度上被忽视了。针对第一个或战略采用问题,我认为两个变量的相互作用-(1)敌人对客户构成的威胁类型;(2)敌人迅速战胜客户的可能性决定了核保护国在四种选择中的战略:常规防御协议、前沿常规部署、核防御协议和前沿核部署。至于第二个问题,即战略实施问题,我认为每一项战略都体现为预先部署在前沿或后方的常规和核力量的独特混合。我用两种方法来检验我的延伸威慑理论。首先,我做一个一致性测试。其次,我进行了两个案例研究——美国对韩国和菲律宾的延伸威慑。最后,我讨论了美国目前对首尔和马尼拉的安全承诺的政策含义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategies of Extended Deterrence: How States Provide the Security Umbrella
Abstract What extended deterrence strategies are available to nuclear patrons, and what factors determine which strategy they adopt? How does each strategy manifest as force employment? The bulk of the literature on extended deterrence focuses on its effectiveness. The question of how nuclear patrons select between and employ strategies of extended deterrence, however, has largely been overlooked. Addressing the first, or strategy adoption, question, I argue that the interaction of two variables—(1) the type of threat posed to a client by an enemy; and (2) the likelihood of an enemy’s quick victory over a client—determines a nuclear patron’s strategy among four options: a conventional defense pact, forward conventional deployment, a nuclear defense pact, and forward nuclear deployment. Addressing the second, or strategy implementation, question, I argue that each strategy is embodied as the unique mixture of conventional and nuclear forces pre-positioned in either forward or rear areas. I test my theory of extended deterrence in two ways. First, I conduct a congruence test. Second, I perform two case studies—US extended deterrence to South Korea and the Philippines. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the current US security commitments to Seoul and Manila.
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来源期刊
Security Studies
Security Studies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
16.70%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: Security Studies publishes innovative scholarly manuscripts that make a significant contribution – whether theoretical, empirical, or both – to our understanding of international security. Studies that do not emphasize the causes and consequences of war or the sources and conditions of peace fall outside the journal’s domain. Security Studies features articles that develop, test, and debate theories of international security – that is, articles that address an important research question, display innovation in research, contribute in a novel way to a body of knowledge, and (as appropriate) demonstrate theoretical development with state-of-the art use of appropriate methodological tools. While we encourage authors to discuss the policy implications of their work, articles that are primarily policy-oriented do not fit the journal’s mission. The journal publishes articles that challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of international security studies. Security Studies includes a wide range of topics ranging from nuclear proliferation and deterrence, civil-military relations, strategic culture, ethnic conflicts and their resolution, epidemics and national security, democracy and foreign-policy decision making, developments in qualitative and multi-method research, and the future of security studies.
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