介入道义推理

IF 1.1 0 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS
Woojin Chung
{"title":"介入道义推理","authors":"Woojin Chung","doi":"10.3765/sp.13.16","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The ‘if p , ought p ’ problem, famously known as Zvolenszky’s puzzle (Zvolenszky 2002), questions whether possible world semantics can assign proper truth conditions to sentences of the form ‘if p , ought p ’. This paper suggests that it is not a problem of possible worlds semantics of modality, but rather, the ‘if p , ought p ’ problem reveals the counterfactual nature of deontic modals which otherwise would have gone unnoticed. I propose that a counterfactual-based formulation of deontic necessity that implements intervention, jointly with the assumption that indicative conditionals facilitate backtracking, offers a principled solution to the ‘if p , ought p ’ problem. I also present empirical evidence in favor of an interventionist approach to counterfactuals as opposed to similarity-based theories, at least in the domain of deontic reasoning. \n \nEARLY ACCESS","PeriodicalId":45550,"journal":{"name":"Semantics & Pragmatics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Intervention in deontic reasoning\",\"authors\":\"Woojin Chung\",\"doi\":\"10.3765/sp.13.16\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The ‘if p , ought p ’ problem, famously known as Zvolenszky’s puzzle (Zvolenszky 2002), questions whether possible world semantics can assign proper truth conditions to sentences of the form ‘if p , ought p ’. This paper suggests that it is not a problem of possible worlds semantics of modality, but rather, the ‘if p , ought p ’ problem reveals the counterfactual nature of deontic modals which otherwise would have gone unnoticed. I propose that a counterfactual-based formulation of deontic necessity that implements intervention, jointly with the assumption that indicative conditionals facilitate backtracking, offers a principled solution to the ‘if p , ought p ’ problem. I also present empirical evidence in favor of an interventionist approach to counterfactuals as opposed to similarity-based theories, at least in the domain of deontic reasoning. \\n \\nEARLY ACCESS\",\"PeriodicalId\":45550,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Semantics & Pragmatics\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-11-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Semantics & Pragmatics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.13.16\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Semantics & Pragmatics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.13.16","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

"如果p,应该p "问题,即著名的Zvolenszky难题(Zvolenszky 2002),它质疑可能世界语义能否为"如果p,应该p "形式的句子赋予适当的真值条件。本文认为这不是情态的可能世界语义问题,而是“如果p,应该p”问题揭示了道义情态的反事实性质,否则就会被忽视。我提出了一种基于反事实的道义必要性公式,它实现了干预,与指示性条件有助于回溯的假设一起,为“如果p,应该p”问题提供了一个原则性的解决方案。我还提出了经验证据,支持干预主义方法来处理反事实,而不是基于相似性的理论,至少在道义推理领域是这样。早期访问
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Intervention in deontic reasoning
The ‘if p , ought p ’ problem, famously known as Zvolenszky’s puzzle (Zvolenszky 2002), questions whether possible world semantics can assign proper truth conditions to sentences of the form ‘if p , ought p ’. This paper suggests that it is not a problem of possible worlds semantics of modality, but rather, the ‘if p , ought p ’ problem reveals the counterfactual nature of deontic modals which otherwise would have gone unnoticed. I propose that a counterfactual-based formulation of deontic necessity that implements intervention, jointly with the assumption that indicative conditionals facilitate backtracking, offers a principled solution to the ‘if p , ought p ’ problem. I also present empirical evidence in favor of an interventionist approach to counterfactuals as opposed to similarity-based theories, at least in the domain of deontic reasoning. EARLY ACCESS
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
14
审稿时长
50 weeks
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信