总统的赞助和行政部门的任命，1925-1959

IF 1.1 4区社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Presidential Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2022-01-20 DOI:10.1111/psq.12768

Jon C. Rogowski, Tyler Simko

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们把总统的赞助作为一种分配政治来研究。为此，我们引入了1925年至1959年间行政部门监督人员的综合数据，并将每个官僚与其所在选区的国会代表联系起来。我们确定了关于选举考虑、党派关系和立法支持对跨地区官僚任命分配的影响的可测试假设。各种固定效应估计策略的结果与总统庇护的几种形式一致。我们的研究结果提供了初步证据，说明行政部门通过任免任命管理的机制，并说明总统政治如何影响联邦政府的组成。

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Presidential Patronage and Executive Branch Appointments, 1925–1959

We study presidential patronage as a form of distributive politics. To do so, we introduce comprehensive data on supervisory personnel in the executive branch between 1925 and 1959 and link each bureaucrat to the congressional representative from their home district. We identify testable hypotheses regarding the impact of electoral considerations, partisanship, and legislative support on the distribution of bureaucratic appointments across districts. Results from a variety of ﬁ xed-effects estimation strategies are consistent with several forms of presidential patronage. Our results provide initial evidence about the mechanisms through which patronage appointments are administered in the executive branch and illustrate how presidential politics affects the composition of the federal government.

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来源期刊

Presidential Studies Quarterly POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

12.50%

发文量