什么是悖论?

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
C. Cowie
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引用次数: 0

摘要

根据一种标准观点,悖论是有貌似合理的前提,却导致不可信的结论的论点。这是错误的。在许多悖论中,前提是不可信的,正是因为它们导致了不可信的结论。对这个问题的明显回应——包括前提是单独可信的,撇开它们导致一个不可信的结论这一事实,它们是可信的——被证明是不充分的。然后介绍了一种非常不同的悖论观点。这是一种功能主义的观点,根据这种观点,悖论是以特有的方式迷惑人们的事物。有人声称,这种观点也是站不住脚的,原因也完全相同。其结果是一个关于悖论本质的新难题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What are Paradoxes?
According to a standard view, paradoxes are arguments with plausible premises that entail an implausible conclusion. This is false. In many paradoxes the premises are not plausible precisely because they entail an implausible conclusion. Obvious responses to this problem—including that the premises are individually plausible and that they are plausible setting aside the fact that they entail an implausible conclusion—are shown to be inadequate. A very different view of paradox is then introduced. This is a functionalist view according to which paradoxes are the kinds of things that puzzle people in characteristic ways. It is claimed that this view, too, fails and for the very same reason. The result is a new puzzle about the nature of paradoxes.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
10.00%
发文量
73
期刊介绍: Appearing quarterly in print and online, the Journal of the American Philosophical Association provides a platform for original work in all areas of philosophy. The Journal aims to publish compelling papers written in a way that can be appreciated by philosophers of every persuasion and to review papers quickly (typically within 30 days of submission) and fairly (using a triple anonymous review system), encouraging succinct, constructive reports. Papers are published online early via FirstView (typically within 8 weeks of acceptance).
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