专制官僚的头重脚轻:来自俄罗斯和中国的证据

IF 2.7 4区 管理学 Q2 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Tao Li, Zhenyu M. Wang
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引用次数: 3

摘要

帕金森氏(Parkinson)、图洛克(Tullock)、尼斯卡宁(Niskanen)或西蒙(Simon)的理论或经典管理理论都无法解释非民主国家普遍存在的头重头轻的官僚机构。当官僚职位带有租金时,晋升竞争就变成了寻租过程。借用管理学术的职业锦标赛理论框架,我们认为头重脚轻的官僚主义类似于决赛选手太多的锦标赛。当租金集中在高层时(即权力集中),就像许多非民主国家的情况一样,最理想的官僚机构应该是头重头轻的,容纳和鼓励相对更多的高层最终入围者争夺最终的大奖。我们通过分析中国(1993-2014)和俄罗斯(2002-2015)的部委组织提供了启发性证据。在经历了一些波动之后,俄罗斯政府部门的形态最终与中国趋同。在稳定状态下,它们的部门形态远比管理理论所规定的头重脚轻。在微观层面上,以部长的感知影响力衡量的部门权力集中与俄罗斯的部门头重脚轻相关。我们的理论表明,头重脚轻的专制官僚结构自然是由后负荷的连续职业锦标赛和努力最大化的官僚主义领导者产生的。我们的研究结果还表明,从长远来看,中国和俄罗斯的部委都趋向于高度头重脚轻的结构。我们证明,头重脚轻的结构首先出现在苏联的计划经济实验中。我们的研究为公共部门改革提供了新的视角,这些改革旨在减少专制国家的官僚作风。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The top-heavy shape of authoritarian bureaucracy: evidence from Russia and China
The prevalence of top-heavy bureaucracies in non-democracies cannot be explained by the theories of Parkinson, Tullock, Niskanen, or Simon or by classical managerial theories. When bureaucracy positions carry rents, the competition for promotion becomes a rent-seeking process. Borrowing the career-tournament theory framework from managerial scholarship, we argue that top-heavy bureaucracy resembles a tournament with too many finalists. When rent is centralized at the top (i.e. power centralization), as is the case in many non-democracies, the optimal bureaucracy should be top-heavy, accommodating and encouraging relatively more finalists at the top to compete for the final big prize. We provide suggestive evidence by analyzing ministry organizations in China (1993–2014) and Russia (2002–2015). After some fluctuations, the shape of Russian ministries eventually converged with that of China. In the steady state, their ministry shapes are far more top-heavy than what is prescribed by managerial theories. At the micro-level, ministry power centralization, measured by the perceived influence of the ministers, is correlated with ministry top-heaviness in Russia. Points for practitioners Our theory suggests that a top-heavy authoritarian bureaucratic structure naturally follows from a back-loaded sequential career tournament and an effort-maximizing bureaucratic leader. Our findings also suggest that Chinese and Russian ministries both converge to a highly top-heavy structure in the long run. We demonstrate that the top-heavy structure first arose during the planned-economy experiment in the Soviet Union. Our research sheds new light on public-sector reforms that aim to reduce bureaucracy top-heaviness in autocracies.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.10
自引率
4.30%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: IRAS is an international peer-reviewed journal devoted to academic and professional public administration. Founded in 1927 it is the oldest scholarly public administration journal specifically focused on comparative and international topics. IRAS seeks to shape the future agenda of public administration around the world by encouraging reflection on international comparisons, new techniques and approaches, the dialogue between academics and practitioners, and debates about the future of the field itself.
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