{"title":"在政策不确定的情况下,有政治关系的董事是否扮演着信息角色?","authors":"Bunyamin Onal","doi":"10.1016/j.mulfin.2023.100787","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine whether politically connected directors (PCDs) play an information role in corporate investments in periods of uncertainty about government policy (PU). Our identification strategy relies on a 2013 ruling in China which mandated eviction of PCDs from corporate boards. Using difference-in-differences estimation around the ruling, we find that PU is less disruptive to capital expenditures and acquisitions in the presence of PCDs and this benefit dissipates in their absence. Managers also pay closer attention to stock price signals after their firms get politically disconnected. Thus, we conclude that political connections provide informational benefits that facilitate corporate investments under PU.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47268,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Multinational Financial Management","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 100787"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do politically connected directors play an information role under policy uncertainty?\",\"authors\":\"Bunyamin Onal\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.mulfin.2023.100787\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We examine whether politically connected directors (PCDs) play an information role in corporate investments in periods of uncertainty about government policy (PU). Our identification strategy relies on a 2013 ruling in China which mandated eviction of PCDs from corporate boards. Using difference-in-differences estimation around the ruling, we find that PU is less disruptive to capital expenditures and acquisitions in the presence of PCDs and this benefit dissipates in their absence. Managers also pay closer attention to stock price signals after their firms get politically disconnected. Thus, we conclude that political connections provide informational benefits that facilitate corporate investments under PU.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47268,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Multinational Financial Management\",\"volume\":\"68 \",\"pages\":\"Article 100787\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Multinational Financial Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042444X23000063\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Multinational Financial Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042444X23000063","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do politically connected directors play an information role under policy uncertainty?
We examine whether politically connected directors (PCDs) play an information role in corporate investments in periods of uncertainty about government policy (PU). Our identification strategy relies on a 2013 ruling in China which mandated eviction of PCDs from corporate boards. Using difference-in-differences estimation around the ruling, we find that PU is less disruptive to capital expenditures and acquisitions in the presence of PCDs and this benefit dissipates in their absence. Managers also pay closer attention to stock price signals after their firms get politically disconnected. Thus, we conclude that political connections provide informational benefits that facilitate corporate investments under PU.
期刊介绍:
International trade, financing and investments have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years, and the operations of corporations have become increasingly multinationalized. Corporate executives buying and selling goods and services, and making financing and investment decisions across national boundaries, have developed policies and procedures for managing cash flows denominated in foreign currencies. These policies and procedures, and the related managerial actions of executives, change as new relevant information becomes available. The purpose of the Journal of Multinational Financial Management is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the management of the multinational enterprise. Theoretical, conceptual, and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • Foreign exchange risk management • International capital budgeting • Forecasting exchange rates • Foreign direct investment • Hedging strategies • Cost of capital • Managing transaction exposure • Political risk assessment • International working capital management • International financial planning • International tax management • International diversification • Transfer pricing strategies • International liability management • International mergers.