在政策不确定的情况下,有政治关系的董事是否扮演着信息角色?

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Bunyamin Onal
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们研究了在政府政策不确定时期,政治关联董事(PCDs)是否在公司投资中发挥信息作用。我们的识别策略依赖于2013年中国的一项裁决,该裁决要求将个人电脑业人士逐出公司董事会。使用围绕裁决的差异中之差估计,我们发现,在PCDs存在的情况下,PU对资本支出和收购的破坏性较小,而这种好处在PCDs不存在的情况下消散。在公司与政治脱节后,经理们也会更加关注股价信号。因此,我们得出结论,政治关系提供了信息利益,促进了企业在PU下的投资。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do politically connected directors play an information role under policy uncertainty?

We examine whether politically connected directors (PCDs) play an information role in corporate investments in periods of uncertainty about government policy (PU). Our identification strategy relies on a 2013 ruling in China which mandated eviction of PCDs from corporate boards. Using difference-in-differences estimation around the ruling, we find that PU is less disruptive to capital expenditures and acquisitions in the presence of PCDs and this benefit dissipates in their absence. Managers also pay closer attention to stock price signals after their firms get politically disconnected. Thus, we conclude that political connections provide informational benefits that facilitate corporate investments under PU.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
4.80%
发文量
25
审稿时长
30 days
期刊介绍: International trade, financing and investments have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years, and the operations of corporations have become increasingly multinationalized. Corporate executives buying and selling goods and services, and making financing and investment decisions across national boundaries, have developed policies and procedures for managing cash flows denominated in foreign currencies. These policies and procedures, and the related managerial actions of executives, change as new relevant information becomes available. The purpose of the Journal of Multinational Financial Management is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the management of the multinational enterprise. Theoretical, conceptual, and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • Foreign exchange risk management • International capital budgeting • Forecasting exchange rates • Foreign direct investment • Hedging strategies • Cost of capital • Managing transaction exposure • Political risk assessment • International working capital management • International financial planning • International tax management • International diversification • Transfer pricing strategies • International liability management • International mergers.
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