Oliver Unger , Andrea Szczesny , Martin Holderried
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Does performance pay increase productivity? Evidence from a medical typing unit
Using unique data from a medical typing unit (2011–2014), this paper empirically explores the influence of performance pay on employee productivity in a risk-less low incentive intensity environment. We analyze a routine task performed by lower-level employees. We analyze a setting with strong sectoral agreements and thus a clear (and comparatively high) basic wage level set by the general collective bargaining agreement. We find that despite the risk-less design and low incentive intensity of the setting, switching employees from fixed wages to partially performance-based compensation (PPBC) significantly increases the number of typed pages by 9.53%. Over a one-year period, this rate of increase translates into approximately one additional month of output at a fraction of the usual cost. We also find that these results do not disappear over time. In contrast, the observed gains split into an initial increase in productivity following the switch to PPBC (+3.25%) and additional gains while an employee remains on PPBC. Therefore, we assume that a type of learning begins once an employee switches to PPBC and that this learning is the most pronounced during the first months following the change in compensation. Furthermore, we find no evidence of potentially misplaced incentives in the selection of tasks by the employees (i.e., cherry picking) and no indications of reduced quality.
期刊介绍:
Management Accounting Research aims to serve as a vehicle for publishing original research in the field of management accounting. Its contributions include case studies, field work, and other empirical research, analytical modelling, scholarly papers, distinguished review articles, comments, and notes. It provides an international forum for the dissemination of research, with papers written by prestigious international authors discussing and analysing management accounting in many different parts of the world.