Who Controls the Past: Far-Sighted Bargaining in International Regimes

How do international regimes change over time? Regimes facilitate cooperation by linking together otherwise ad hoc negotiations. These linkages endogenize the status quo from which subsequent negotiations depart. I develop a theory of endogenous status quo within international regimes: prior outcomes implicitly define the status quo of new negotiations by acting as focal points and by creating inconsistency costs. I test observable implications of the theory in the context of the multilateral trade regime, focusing on new member accession negotiations. These negotiations attract interest from a surprising subset of World Trade Organization members, many with few observable trade ties or other economic incentives to participate. Nonetheless participation enables states to shape the emergent status quo strategically, with potentially far-reaching implications for future bargaining. I employ a text-as-data approach—together with a novel corpus of negotiating documents—finding consistent support for the theory and mechanisms.