关于执法审查的公司披露

IF 4.6 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Jörg-Markus Hitz, H. Schnack
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引用次数: 3

摘要

摘要本文提供了与执法审查相关的公司自愿披露的描述性证据。我们的分析是在德国的制度环境中进行的,在德国,如果执法机构在审查结束后正式建立财务报表以包含重大错误,则公司被要求披露错误公告。我们发现,公司在很少情况下自愿披露正在进行的执法审查,而他们选择更频繁地披露已完成的审查信息。内容分析表明,正在进行的审查的披露格式可能与最终的审查结果有关,这与公司故意使用这些披露是一致的。这一解释得到了与正在进行的审查有关的披露的额外多变量分析的支持,这些分析更有可能是有争议的审查。对市场反应的分析提供了微弱的证据,表明投资者对这些披露进行了定价,因为市场对披露错误发现的负面反应得到了缓解。因此,我们的论文为越来越多的关于会计执行的文献提供了一个新的角度,并对公司层面的战略披露激励产生了见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews
Abstract This paper provides descriptive evidence on voluntary firm disclosures related to enforcement reviews. Our analyses are set in the German institutional environment, where firms are mandated to disclose error announcements if enforcement institutions, after conclusion of the review, formally establish financial statements to contain material errors. We find that firms provide voluntary disclosures about ongoing enforcement reviews on rare occasions while they opt to disclose information about concluded reviews more frequently. Content analyses reveal that the format of disclosures about ongoing reviews is potentially associated with the eventual review outcome, which is consistent with firms deliberately using these disclosures. This interpretation is supported by additional multivariate analyses of disclosures relating to ongoing reviews, which turn out more likely for contentious reviews. Analysis of market reactions provides weak evidence that investors price these disclosures, as negative market responses to the disclosure of error findings are mitigated. Hence, our paper provides a novel angle on the growing literature on accounting enforcement and yields insights into firm-level incentives for strategic disclosures.
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来源期刊
Accounting in Europe
Accounting in Europe BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
14
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