工资公布还是工资谈判?使用双重职位的测试

IF 3.9 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Journal of Labor Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.1086/718321

Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Mas, Raffaele Saggio, Stephen A. Woodbury

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引用次数: 14

摘要

我们采用揭示偏好测试来区分工资发布和工资议价。使用华盛顿州双职工的样本，我们估计了工资和离职率对第二份工作工资冲击的敏感性。在工资分配的较低部分，外部选择的改善导致更高的离职率，但不会导致更高的工资，这与工资发布一致。在工资最高的四分位数中，外部选择的改善转化为更高的工资，而不是更高的离职率，这与讨价还价一致。总的来说，讨价还价似乎是工资设定的有限决定因素。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders

We employ a revealed preference test to distinguish between wage posting and wage bargaining. Using a sample of dual jobholders in Washington State, we estimate the sensitivity of wages and separation rates to wage shocks in a secondary job. In lower parts of the wage distribution, improvements in the outside option lead to higher separations rates but not to higher wages, consistent with wage posting. In the highest wage quartile, improved outside options translate to higher wages but not higher separation rates, consistent with bargaining. In the aggregate, bargaining appears to be a limited determinant of wage setting.

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来源期刊

Journal of Labor Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

2.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Since 1983, the Journal of Labor Economics has presented international research that examines issues affecting the economy as well as social and private behavior. The Journal publishes both theoretical and applied research results relating to the U.S. and international data. And its contributors investigate various aspects of labor economics, including supply and demand of labor services, personnel economics, distribution of income, unions and collective bargaining, applied and policy issues in labor economics, and labor markets and demographics.