宽容有什么错?庄子尊重的另一种选择

IF 0.2 3区 哲学 0 ASIAN STUDIES
{"title":"宽容有什么错?庄子尊重的另一种选择","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/15406253-12340088","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nToleration has been almost universally regarded as an indispensable virtue one ought to have when encountering people of races, religions, languages, cultures, genders, and sexual orientations different from one’s own. This is unfortunate, however, because toleration includes objection as one of its necessary components: to tolerate an object means to have objection to it though without interfering with it. However, it is wrong to think we have, and it is wrong for us to have, objection to people simply because of their races, religions, languages, cultures, genders, and sextual orientations different from us. The proper virtue we ought to cultivate in this context is respect as advocated in the Zhuangzi, which is fundamentally different from respect that has sometimes been associated with the very conception of toleration.","PeriodicalId":45346,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What’s Wrong with Toleration? The Zhuangzian Respect as an Alternative\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/15406253-12340088\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nToleration has been almost universally regarded as an indispensable virtue one ought to have when encountering people of races, religions, languages, cultures, genders, and sexual orientations different from one’s own. This is unfortunate, however, because toleration includes objection as one of its necessary components: to tolerate an object means to have objection to it though without interfering with it. However, it is wrong to think we have, and it is wrong for us to have, objection to people simply because of their races, religions, languages, cultures, genders, and sextual orientations different from us. The proper virtue we ought to cultivate in this context is respect as advocated in the Zhuangzi, which is fundamentally different from respect that has sometimes been associated with the very conception of toleration.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45346,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-04-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/15406253-12340088\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"ASIAN STUDIES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15406253-12340088","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"ASIAN STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

宽容几乎被普遍认为是一个人在遇到与自己不同种族、宗教、语言、文化、性别和性取向的人时应该具备的一种不可或缺的美德。然而,这是不幸的,因为容忍将反对作为其必要组成部分之一:容忍一个对象意味着反对它,但不干涉它。然而,仅仅因为人们的种族、宗教、语言、文化、性别和性取向与我们不同而反对他们,这是错误的,我们也是错误的。在这种情况下,我们应该培养的美德是庄子所提倡的尊重,这与有时与宽容概念联系在一起的尊重有着根本的不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What’s Wrong with Toleration? The Zhuangzian Respect as an Alternative
Toleration has been almost universally regarded as an indispensable virtue one ought to have when encountering people of races, religions, languages, cultures, genders, and sexual orientations different from one’s own. This is unfortunate, however, because toleration includes objection as one of its necessary components: to tolerate an object means to have objection to it though without interfering with it. However, it is wrong to think we have, and it is wrong for us to have, objection to people simply because of their races, religions, languages, cultures, genders, and sextual orientations different from us. The proper virtue we ought to cultivate in this context is respect as advocated in the Zhuangzi, which is fundamentally different from respect that has sometimes been associated with the very conception of toleration.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Since its foundation Journal of Chinese Philosophy has established itself at the forefront of contemporary scholarly understanding of Chinese philosophy, providing an outlet for the dissemination and interpretation of Chinese thought and values. The journal has three main aims: first, to make available careful English-language translations of important materials in the history of Chinese philosophy; second, to publish interpretations and expositions in Chinese philosophy; third, a commitment to publishing comparative studies within Chinese philosophy or in relation to schools of thought in the Western tradition.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信