信息不对称、风险态度与宏观经济表现

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS
T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao
{"title":"信息不对称、风险态度与宏观经济表现","authors":"T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao","doi":"10.1016/j.rie.2023.01.010","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Every firm in differentiated oligopoly offers a product that is different from that of rival firms. Similarly, in general, a firm interfaces with consumers and interacts with rival firms on the market. As a result, both the firm and consumers experience information asymmetry. In practice, a firm is a risk taker in its dealings with rival firms and is a risk averter in its interface with consumers. However, firms utilize intangible investments (non-price strategies) to convey the value of their product to consumers and stabilize their market share. Note that consumers are risk averse and ignore such attempts by a firm once they recognize the intrinsic value of the product. These two features explain the frequency and depth of the supply fluctuations that have not been acknowledged so far. This study offers a fundamental explanation of this phenomenon along with the steady state behavior in a synthetic manner.</p><p>“With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of production activity.”- <span>Knight (1957</span>, p.267)</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46094,"journal":{"name":"Research in Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Pages 178-184"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Information asymmetry, attitudes toward risk, and macroeconomic performance\",\"authors\":\"T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.rie.2023.01.010\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Every firm in differentiated oligopoly offers a product that is different from that of rival firms. Similarly, in general, a firm interfaces with consumers and interacts with rival firms on the market. As a result, both the firm and consumers experience information asymmetry. In practice, a firm is a risk taker in its dealings with rival firms and is a risk averter in its interface with consumers. However, firms utilize intangible investments (non-price strategies) to convey the value of their product to consumers and stabilize their market share. Note that consumers are risk averse and ignore such attempts by a firm once they recognize the intrinsic value of the product. These two features explain the frequency and depth of the supply fluctuations that have not been acknowledged so far. This study offers a fundamental explanation of this phenomenon along with the steady state behavior in a synthetic manner.</p><p>“With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of production activity.”- <span>Knight (1957</span>, p.267)</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46094,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Research in Economics\",\"volume\":\"77 1\",\"pages\":\"Pages 178-184\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Research in Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944323000054\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research in Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944323000054","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

在差异化寡头垄断中,每个企业提供的产品都不同于竞争对手的产品。同样,一般来说,企业与消费者接触,并与市场上的竞争对手互动。因此,企业和消费者都经历了信息不对称。在实践中,一个公司在与竞争对手的交易中是一个风险承担者,在与消费者的接触中是一个风险规避者。然而,企业利用无形投资(非价格策略)向消费者传达其产品的价值并稳定其市场份额。请注意,消费者是风险厌恶者,一旦他们认识到产品的内在价值,就会忽略公司的这种尝试。这两个特征解释了迄今为止尚未得到承认的供应波动的频率和深度。本研究以综合的方式对这一现象以及稳态行为提供了一个基本的解释。“如果不确定性完全消失,每个人都对情况了如指掌,就没有必要对生产活动进行任何负责任的管理或控制。——奈特(1957,第267页)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Information asymmetry, attitudes toward risk, and macroeconomic performance

Every firm in differentiated oligopoly offers a product that is different from that of rival firms. Similarly, in general, a firm interfaces with consumers and interacts with rival firms on the market. As a result, both the firm and consumers experience information asymmetry. In practice, a firm is a risk taker in its dealings with rival firms and is a risk averter in its interface with consumers. However, firms utilize intangible investments (non-price strategies) to convey the value of their product to consumers and stabilize their market share. Note that consumers are risk averse and ignore such attempts by a firm once they recognize the intrinsic value of the product. These two features explain the frequency and depth of the supply fluctuations that have not been acknowledged so far. This study offers a fundamental explanation of this phenomenon along with the steady state behavior in a synthetic manner.

“With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of production activity.”- Knight (1957, p.267)

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
37
审稿时长
89 days
期刊介绍: Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信