股票期权和股票奖励是否为管理者提供了不同的公司信息披露激励?

IF 16.4 1区化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Accounts of Chemical Research Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1016/j.adiac.2022.100628

Emrah Ekici , Marina Y. Ruseva

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考察了高管股权薪酬与公司信息披露之间的关系。具体而言，我们提出期权和股票奖励为高管向市场参与者披露预测提供了不同的激励。由于期权比股票奖励风险更大，获得更多期权的高管将有更大的动机引导投资者并影响股价，以最大限度地提高他们的薪酬。我们发现，高管股权薪酬中期权比例越大，发布盈利预测的可能性越大，发布预测的频率也越高。总体而言，这些结果表明，期权比股票奖励更能激励高管缓解信息披露代理问题。

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Do stock options and stock awards provide managers different incentives for corporate disclosure?

We examine the relation between executive equity compensation and corporate disclosure. Specifically, we propose that options and stock awards provide executives with distinct incentives to disclose forecasts to market participants. Since options are risker than stock awards, executives receiving more options will have greater incentives to guide investors and influence the stock price to maximize their compensation payout. We find that a greater proportion of options in executive equity compensation is associated with a greater likelihood to issue earnings forecasts as well as with greater frequency. Overall, these results suggest that options provide executives with stronger incentives than stock awards to mitigate the disclosure agency problem.

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来源期刊

Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合

CiteScore

31.40

自引率

1.10%

发文量

312

审稿时长

2 months

期刊介绍： Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.