N队联盟中收入公平分配与内生工资上限的动态分析

IF 1.8 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Sports Economics Pub Date : 2022-12-12 DOI:10.1177/15270025221143983

Masaki Fujimoto

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了在动态环境中，平等收入分配和内生工资上限的综合效应。研究表明：（i）平等的收入分配和工资上限相结合并不能消除联赛中的竞争失衡；（ii）球员工资的份额对球队之间的人才分配没有影响；（iii）在收入平等的情况下，引入工资限制并不是为了防止球员工资上涨，而是为了防止工资下降；（iv）在收入分配和工资上限平等的情况下，逆向选秀与球队的人才投资激励不相容。

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A Dynamic Analysis of Equal Revenue Sharing and Endogenous Salary Caps in the N-Team Leagues

This article studies the combined effect of equal revenue sharing and endogenous salary caps in a dynamical setting. It is shown that (i) a combination of equal revenue sharing and salary caps cannot eliminate competitive imbalance in the league; (ii) the share of player salaries has no impact on the distribution of talent among teams; (iii) under equal revenue sharing, the introduction of salary restrictions is not meant to prevent player salaries from rising, but to prevent them from falling; and (iv) under equal revenue sharing and salary caps, the reverse-order draft is incompatible with talent investment incentives of teams.

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来源期刊

Journal of Sports Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

17.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Journal of Sports Economics publishes scholarly research in the field of sports economics. The aim of the journal is to further research in the area of sports economics by bringing together theoretical and empirical research in a single intellectual venue. Relevant topics include: labor market research; labor-management relations; collective bargaining; wage determination; local public finance; and other fields related to the economics of sports. Published quarterly, the Journal of Sports Economics is unique in that it is the only journal devoted specifically to this rapidly growing field.