贸易关系中的最优支付合同

IF 1.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Economic Review Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI:10.1111/iere.12636

Christian Fischer-Thöne

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在买卖双方关系中，向买方提供贸易信贷可以促进长期合作，但卖方的规定会随着关系的发展而系统性地变化。研究了卖方关于买方的信息不完全时的最优贸易信贷供给动态。我们展示了自我执行关系契约和正式契约的相互作用如何决定最优支付契约选择。我们发现，支付合同可以被解释为筛选技术，并暗示着对买方类型的不同学习机会。根据经验证据，该模型预测，从长期来看，所有付款条件之间的转换都会导致卖方贸易信贷提供。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

OPTIMAL PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS

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OPTIMAL PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS

In buyer–seller relationships, offering trade credit to buyers fosters long-term collaboration but seller provision varies systematically as relationships evolve. We study the optimal provision dynamics of trade credit when the seller's information about the buyer is incomplete. We show how the interaction of self-enforcing relational contracts and formal contracts determines optimal payment contract choice. We find that payment contracts can be interpreted as screening technologies and imply distinct learning opportunities about the buyer's type. In line with empirical evidence, the model predicts that all transitions between payment terms lead to seller trade credit provision in the long run.

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来源期刊

International Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The International Economic Review was established in 1960 to provide a forum for modern quantitative economics. From its inception, the journal has tried to stimulate economic research around the world by publishing cutting edge papers in many areas of economics, including econometrics, economic theory, macro, and applied economics.