{"title":"在解释拒绝伪科学、超自然现象和阴谋论信仰时,分析思维胜过流动推理","authors":"Jan Jastrzębski, Adam Chuderski","doi":"10.1016/j.intell.2022.101705","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Around one third of people across populations hold beliefs in epistemically unwarranted claims and theories. Why this effect is so strong remains elusive. In three studies (total <em>N</em> = 827), we clarified the relationships of fluid reasoning ability, analytic thinking style (indexed by non-intuitiveness and open-mindedness), and unwarranted beliefs in pseudoscience, paranormal phenomena, and conspiracy theories. Fluid reasoning predicted about 11% of variance in rejection of pseudoscience, but only 4% – in paranormal beliefs, and less than 2.5% – in conspiracist beliefs. By contrast, analytic thinking substantially predicted rejection of all the three kinds of beliefs, explaining 37% variance in pseudoscience and around 20% variance in paranormal and conspiracist beliefs. A novel finding indicated that fluid reasoning and analytic thinking predicted rejection of pseudoscience in an over-additive interaction. Fluid reasoning and analytic thinking explained the common variance shared by unwarranted beliefs, but not the belief-specific variance. Their relationships with unwarranted beliefs were stronger for males than for females. Overall, the three studies suggest that analytic thinking is more important than cognitive ability for adopting epistemically supported world-view.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":3,"journal":{"name":"ACS Applied Electronic Materials","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289622000861/pdfft?md5=bb495b37892b9331c1558c669ed4717e&pid=1-s2.0-S0160289622000861-main.pdf","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Analytic thinking outruns fluid reasoning in explaining rejection of pseudoscience, paranormal, and conspiracist beliefs\",\"authors\":\"Jan Jastrzębski, Adam Chuderski\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.intell.2022.101705\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Around one third of people across populations hold beliefs in epistemically unwarranted claims and theories. Why this effect is so strong remains elusive. In three studies (total <em>N</em> = 827), we clarified the relationships of fluid reasoning ability, analytic thinking style (indexed by non-intuitiveness and open-mindedness), and unwarranted beliefs in pseudoscience, paranormal phenomena, and conspiracy theories. Fluid reasoning predicted about 11% of variance in rejection of pseudoscience, but only 4% – in paranormal beliefs, and less than 2.5% – in conspiracist beliefs. By contrast, analytic thinking substantially predicted rejection of all the three kinds of beliefs, explaining 37% variance in pseudoscience and around 20% variance in paranormal and conspiracist beliefs. A novel finding indicated that fluid reasoning and analytic thinking predicted rejection of pseudoscience in an over-additive interaction. Fluid reasoning and analytic thinking explained the common variance shared by unwarranted beliefs, but not the belief-specific variance. Their relationships with unwarranted beliefs were stronger for males than for females. Overall, the three studies suggest that analytic thinking is more important than cognitive ability for adopting epistemically supported world-view.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":3,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACS Applied Electronic Materials\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289622000861/pdfft?md5=bb495b37892b9331c1558c669ed4717e&pid=1-s2.0-S0160289622000861-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACS Applied Electronic Materials\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289622000861\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"材料科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACS Applied Electronic Materials","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289622000861","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"材料科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC","Score":null,"Total":0}
Analytic thinking outruns fluid reasoning in explaining rejection of pseudoscience, paranormal, and conspiracist beliefs
Around one third of people across populations hold beliefs in epistemically unwarranted claims and theories. Why this effect is so strong remains elusive. In three studies (total N = 827), we clarified the relationships of fluid reasoning ability, analytic thinking style (indexed by non-intuitiveness and open-mindedness), and unwarranted beliefs in pseudoscience, paranormal phenomena, and conspiracy theories. Fluid reasoning predicted about 11% of variance in rejection of pseudoscience, but only 4% – in paranormal beliefs, and less than 2.5% – in conspiracist beliefs. By contrast, analytic thinking substantially predicted rejection of all the three kinds of beliefs, explaining 37% variance in pseudoscience and around 20% variance in paranormal and conspiracist beliefs. A novel finding indicated that fluid reasoning and analytic thinking predicted rejection of pseudoscience in an over-additive interaction. Fluid reasoning and analytic thinking explained the common variance shared by unwarranted beliefs, but not the belief-specific variance. Their relationships with unwarranted beliefs were stronger for males than for females. Overall, the three studies suggest that analytic thinking is more important than cognitive ability for adopting epistemically supported world-view.