极限假设

IF 1.1 0 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS
Stefan Kaufmann
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引用次数: 12

摘要

在关于情态和条件句的文献中,极限假设经常被引用,以确保一个简单的必然性定义(所有最小世界的真理)可以安全地取代一个更复杂的定义(参见Lewis和Kratzer的定义,涉及多个量化层)。极限假设本身是由大卫·刘易斯在1973年和1981年提出的,虽然它的合理性有时会受到哲学上的争论,但它的内容很少受到质疑。我表明,事实上没有一个“正确”的极限假设:哪一个是正确的取决于模型的结构性质和必要性的预期概念。语言学文献中最受欢迎的版本对其预期目的来说是不正确的。混乱的根源可以追溯到刘易斯本人。BibTeX信息
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Limit Assumption
In the literature on modality and conditionals, the Limit Assumption is routinely invoked to ensure that a simple definition of necessity (truth at all minimal worlds) can safely be substituted for a more complicated one (cf. Lewis’s and Kratzer’s definitions involving multiple layers of quantification). The Limit Assumption itself was formulated by David Lewis in 1973 and 1981, and while its plausibility has at times been debated on philosophical grounds, its content is rarely questioned. I show that there is in fact no single “correct” Limit Assumption: which one is right depends on structural properties of the model and the intended notion of necessity. The version that is most widely appealed to in the linguistic literature turns out to be incorrect for its intended purpose. The source of the confusion can be traced back to Lewis himself. BibTeX info
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发文量
14
审稿时长
50 weeks
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