纵向差异化双头垄断中的税收和污染:当消费者重要时

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Metroeconomica Pub Date : 2022-10-06 DOI:10.1111/meca.12410
Giulia Ceccantoni, Ornella Tarola, Cecilia Vergari
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在所谓的污染者付费原则的启发下,环境税可以推动一个更可持续的欧洲市场。然而,单方面的缓解措施可能会降低碳密集型产业的竞争力,从而导致重新安置。在本文中,我们想知道税收是否能在不伤害企业的情况下有效地抑制排放。我们分析的切入点是,一个地区的排放水平是由(i)购买脏货的消费者数量和(ii)这些产品的环境质量共同决定的。因此,为了遏制排放,一方面,企业必须降低其产品的排放强度。另一方面,消费者必须减少污染产品的消费。这导致根据购买棕色产品的消费者数量和这些产品的相对质量来定义税收。我们表明,在这种税收下,更低的排放不会以更低的利润为代价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Tax and pollution in a vertically differentiated duopoly: When consumers matter

Inspired by the so-called polluter pays principle, environmental taxes can drive a more sustainable European market. However, unilateral mitigation measures can reduce the competitiveness of carbon-intensive industries, thereby inducing relocation. In this paper, we wonder whether a tax can effectively curb emissions without hurting firms. Our analysis's entry point is that the level of emissions in a region is jointly determined by (i) the number of consumers buying dirty goods and (ii) the environmental quality of these products. Thus, to curb emissions, on the one hand, firms have to reduce their goods' emissions intensity. On the other hand, consumers have to reduce the consumption of dirtier goods. This leads to defining a tax depending on the number of consumers buying the brown products and the relative quality of these products. We show that under this tax, lower emissions do not come at the expense of lower profits.

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来源期刊
Metroeconomica
Metroeconomica ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
15.40%
发文量
43
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