偏袒下电子程序对公共采购的影响评估

IF 0.7 Q3 ECONOMICS
S. G. Belev, V. V. Veterinarov, E. Matveev
{"title":"偏袒下电子程序对公共采购的影响评估","authors":"S. G. Belev, V. V. Veterinarov, E. Matveev","doi":"10.32609/0042-8736-2023-9-47-64","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the effects of electronic procedures for supplier selection in public procurement multi criteria auctions (with a selection of a winner based not only on the price criterion) for the results of research and development (R&D) work in Russia. The electronic procedures in public procurement can increase the number of bidders and lead to lower final contract prices. However, in the presence of favoritism, the effect of electronic procedures may be limited. To identify and evaluate the effects of introduction of electronic procedures, we collected microdata on 4517 composite auctions for R&D results for the period from 12/16/2016 to 12/20/2021. Until 2019, there were practically no electronic multi criteria auctions, and starting from 2019, all multi criteria auctions were in electronic form, which creates quasi-experimental conditions. Favoritism is evaluated based on the frequency of interaction between the customer and the supplier. The results of econometric modeling suggest that the introduction of the electronic procedures do increase competition in multi criteria auctions and lead to lower final contract prices, but the effect is weaker in auctions with potentially affiliated customer and supplier. Moreover, one of the main channels of the negative effect of favoritism is inflated quality criterion scores of affiliated suppliers.","PeriodicalId":45534,"journal":{"name":"Voprosy Ekonomiki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Estimation of electronic procedures effects in public procurement under favoritism\",\"authors\":\"S. G. Belev, V. V. Veterinarov, E. Matveev\",\"doi\":\"10.32609/0042-8736-2023-9-47-64\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper investigates the effects of electronic procedures for supplier selection in public procurement multi criteria auctions (with a selection of a winner based not only on the price criterion) for the results of research and development (R&D) work in Russia. The electronic procedures in public procurement can increase the number of bidders and lead to lower final contract prices. However, in the presence of favoritism, the effect of electronic procedures may be limited. To identify and evaluate the effects of introduction of electronic procedures, we collected microdata on 4517 composite auctions for R&D results for the period from 12/16/2016 to 12/20/2021. Until 2019, there were practically no electronic multi criteria auctions, and starting from 2019, all multi criteria auctions were in electronic form, which creates quasi-experimental conditions. Favoritism is evaluated based on the frequency of interaction between the customer and the supplier. The results of econometric modeling suggest that the introduction of the electronic procedures do increase competition in multi criteria auctions and lead to lower final contract prices, but the effect is weaker in auctions with potentially affiliated customer and supplier. Moreover, one of the main channels of the negative effect of favoritism is inflated quality criterion scores of affiliated suppliers.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45534,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Voprosy Ekonomiki\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Voprosy Ekonomiki\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-9-47-64\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Voprosy Ekonomiki","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-9-47-64","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了公共采购多标准拍卖中供应商选择的电子程序(不仅根据价格标准选择获胜者)对俄罗斯研发工作结果的影响。公共采购中的电子程序可以增加投标人的数量,并降低最终合同价格。然而,在存在偏袒的情况下,电子程序的效果可能是有限的。为了确定和评估引入电子程序的影响,我们收集了2016年12月16日至2021年12月20日期间4517次研发成果综合拍卖的微观数据。直到2019年,几乎没有电子多标准拍卖,从2019年开始,所有多标准拍卖都是电子形式的,这创造了准实验条件。根据客户和供应商之间的互动频率来评估偏好。计量经济学建模的结果表明,电子程序的引入确实增加了多标准拍卖中的竞争,并导致最终合同价格降低,但在有潜在关联客户和供应商的拍卖中,这种影响较弱。此外,关联供应商的质量标准分数虚高是造成偏袒负面影响的主要渠道之一。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Estimation of electronic procedures effects in public procurement under favoritism
This paper investigates the effects of electronic procedures for supplier selection in public procurement multi criteria auctions (with a selection of a winner based not only on the price criterion) for the results of research and development (R&D) work in Russia. The electronic procedures in public procurement can increase the number of bidders and lead to lower final contract prices. However, in the presence of favoritism, the effect of electronic procedures may be limited. To identify and evaluate the effects of introduction of electronic procedures, we collected microdata on 4517 composite auctions for R&D results for the period from 12/16/2016 to 12/20/2021. Until 2019, there were practically no electronic multi criteria auctions, and starting from 2019, all multi criteria auctions were in electronic form, which creates quasi-experimental conditions. Favoritism is evaluated based on the frequency of interaction between the customer and the supplier. The results of econometric modeling suggest that the introduction of the electronic procedures do increase competition in multi criteria auctions and lead to lower final contract prices, but the effect is weaker in auctions with potentially affiliated customer and supplier. Moreover, one of the main channels of the negative effect of favoritism is inflated quality criterion scores of affiliated suppliers.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Voprosy Ekonomiki
Voprosy Ekonomiki ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
86
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信