{"title":"相扑教练问题","authors":"Daniel Rehsmann","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00316-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We address the optimal allocation of stochastically dependent resource bundles to a set of simultaneous contests. For this purpose, we study a modification of the Colonel Blotto Game called the Tennis Coach Problem. We devise a thoroughly probabilistic method of payoff representation and fully characterize equilibria in this class of games. We further formalize the idea of strategic team training in a comparative static setting. The problem applies to several distinct economic interactions but seems most prevalent in team sports with individual matches, for instance, in Tennis and Sumo.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"669-700"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10768571/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Sumo coach problem.\",\"authors\":\"Daniel Rehsmann\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10058-022-00316-4\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>We address the optimal allocation of stochastically dependent resource bundles to a set of simultaneous contests. For this purpose, we study a modification of the Colonel Blotto Game called the Tennis Coach Problem. We devise a thoroughly probabilistic method of payoff representation and fully characterize equilibria in this class of games. We further formalize the idea of strategic team training in a comparative static setting. The problem applies to several distinct economic interactions but seems most prevalent in team sports with individual matches, for instance, in Tennis and Sumo.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44537,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Economic Design\",\"volume\":\"27 1\",\"pages\":\"669-700\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10768571/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Economic Design\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00316-4\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2022/11/4 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Economic Design","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00316-4","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2022/11/4 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
We address the optimal allocation of stochastically dependent resource bundles to a set of simultaneous contests. For this purpose, we study a modification of the Colonel Blotto Game called the Tennis Coach Problem. We devise a thoroughly probabilistic method of payoff representation and fully characterize equilibria in this class of games. We further formalize the idea of strategic team training in a comparative static setting. The problem applies to several distinct economic interactions but seems most prevalent in team sports with individual matches, for instance, in Tennis and Sumo.
期刊介绍:
Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design.
Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design