军事主管，治理和坚定的行为

IF 1.2 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI:10.1016/j.adiac.2021.100563

Chen Cai , Iftekhar Hasan , Yinjie Shen , Shuai Wang

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引用次数: 5

摘要

我们建立了一个具有军事经验的董事会的大型数据集，并记录了大量长期存在的独立军事董事在公司董事会任职。我们发现，拥有独立军事董事的公司与更好的监测结果相关，包括较少过度的CEO薪酬，更强的强制性CEO离职绩效敏感性，以及较少的盈余管理。

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Military directors, governance and firm behavior

We build a large dataset of board of directors with military experience and document a substantial and persistent presence of independent military directors serving on corporate boards. We find that firms with independent military directors are associated with better monitoring outcomes, including less excessive CEO compensation, greater forced CEO turnover–performance sensitivity, and less earnings management.

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来源期刊

Advances in Accounting BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

6.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting continues to provide an important international forum for discourse among and between academic and practicing accountants on the issues of significance. Emphasis continues to be placed on original commentary, critical analysis and creative research.