布伦塔诺论行为、内容和意向性

IF 0.3 0 PHILOSOPHY

Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI:10.1163/18756735-00000176

M. Textor

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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文对布伦塔诺的行为内容概念进行了重构，该概念将心理行为的内容与标记的组合（Merkmale）或单个标记相识别。作者将首先阐明行为内容在布伦塔诺的心理学哲学中所起的作用，然后将提出的内容概念定位于布伦塔诺作品的历史背景以及他在《心理学》时期的作品中。作者将针对潜在的反对意见为这一概念辩护，并探讨其解释潜力。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Brentano on Act, Content and Intentionality

This article offers a reconstruction of Brentano’s notion of act content that identifies the content of a mental act with a combination of marks (Merkmale) or a single such mark. The author will first clarify the role act content plays in Brentano’s philosophy of psychology and then go on to locate the proposed notion of content in the historical context of Brentano’s work as well as in his writings at the time of Psychologie. The author will defend this notion against potential objections and explore its explanatory potential.

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来源期刊

Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量