中国公私伙伴关系的扭曲:中央与地方政府关系的制度视角

IF 3.2 3区管理学 Q1 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Administration & Society Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI:10.1177/00953997231158343

Yexin Mao

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引用次数: 1

摘要

如何解释公私伙伴关系(ppp)的扭曲尚未得到充分探讨。本文借鉴委托代理理论，提出了一个制度激励驱动框架。本文通过对中国PPP案例的分析，发现中央与地方政府关系对PPP绩效的形成起着至关重要的作用。目标不一致和信息不对称导致了两种类型的扭曲。首先，ppp成为地方政府应对上级政府需求的政治任务。第二，公私伙伴关系是创造政治成果的融资工具。这些机会主义行为违背了中央政府PPP政策的目标，增加了政府债务风险。

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The Distortion of Public–Private Partnerships in China: An Institutional Perspective of Central–Local Government Relations

How to explain the distortion of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is underexplored. Drawing on principal–agent theory, this article proposes an institutional incentive-driven framework. Based on a case study of PPPs in China, this article finds that central–local government relationships play a crucial role in shaping PPP performance. Goal incongruence and information asymmetry lead to two types of distortion. First, PPPs become a political task for local governments to respond to higher-level governments’ needs. Second, PPPs serve as financing tools to create political achievements. These opportunistic behaviors violate the goals of the central government’s PPP policy and increase government debt risks.

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来源期刊

Administration & Society PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION-

CiteScore

4.50

自引率

4.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： Administration & Society seeks to further the understanding of public and human service organizations, their administrative processes, and their effect on society. The journal publishes empirically oriented research reports and theoretically specific articles that synthesize or contribute to the advancement of understanding and explanation in these fields. Of particular interest are (1) studies that analyze the effects of the introduction of administrative strategies, programs, change interventions, and training; and (2) studies of intergroup, interorganizational, and organization-environment relationships and policy processes.