俄罗斯复活:其在全球新秩序中的力量和目的

IF 0.8 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
M. Matusevich
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在利比亚东部的油气油田,它真的不需要军阀哈利法·哈夫塔尔,这个为莫斯科提供了进入这个具有重要战略意义的北非国家的最初入口的人。俄罗斯已经开始与哈夫塔尔在利比亚的竞争对手达成协议,以对冲莫斯科的赌注。在这一点上,利比亚演员是如何说服俄罗斯的,更不用说要求他们离开了?在苏丹,俄罗斯的瓦格纳雇佣军已经占领了西部的金矿,以及通过中非共和国到阿拉伯联合酋长国的走私路线。2022年3月,瓦格纳涉嫌在苏丹、乍得和中非共和国边境地区杀害数十名矿工。这反映了瓦格纳在中非共和国和马里侵犯人权的指控。一旦俄罗斯获得了立足点,当地社区甚至国家当局就会受到威胁,在自己的国家内被排斥在外。这是一种以安全为借口开始的自然资源兼并形式。在中非共和国,一名俄罗斯人担任国家安全顾问,瓦格纳担任总统警卫。俄罗斯人还控制了财政部长和海关部长的关键职位。俄语现在是该国的第三种官方语言。回顾拉马尼的评论,人们会质疑俄罗斯有意推进多极秩序的前提。相反,莫斯科似乎在追求自己的秩序——一个依附于俄罗斯的附庸国网络。这样看来,它与普京如此怀念的苏联模式并没有太大区别。这似乎不是一个非常可持续的伙伴关系的基础。在俄罗斯获得影响力的每一个非洲国家,经济增长和稳定的前景都是黯淡的。此外,对俄罗斯积极颠覆苏丹、阿尔及利亚、突尼斯、埃及、乌干达、刚果民主共和国和津巴布韦等地的民主转型,也存在强烈不满。拉马尼引用的民意调查显示,普京和俄罗斯在普通非洲公民中绝对不受欢迎。但在俄罗斯精英的共同选择模式下,非洲的民意并不重要。从莫斯科的角度来看,破坏战略正在按计划展开。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order
hydrocarbon fields in eastern Libya, it really does not need warlord Khalifa Haftar, the front man who provided Moscow its initial entry point to this strategically important North African country. Russia has moved on to strike deals with Haftar’s rivals in Libya, hedging Moscow’s bets. And just how does any Libyan actor reel Russia in at this point, much less ask them to depart? In Sudan, Russia’s Wagner mercenaries have secured gold mines in the west and trafficking routes through CAR to the United Arab Emirates. In March 2022, Wagner was implicated in the killing of dozens of miners in this region along the Sudan, Chad, and CAR border. This mirrors allegations of Wagner human rights abuses in CAR and Mali. Once Russia has gained a foothold, local communities and even national authorities are intimidated into exclusion – within their own countries. This represents a form of natural resource annexation that starts under the pretext of security. In CAR, a Russian is the national security advisor and Wagner serves as the presidential guard. Russians also have taken control of key positions at the Minister of Finance and Customs. Russian is now the third official language in the country. Reflecting on Ramani’s review, one questions the premise that Russia is intent on advancing a multipolar order. Instead, Moscow appears to be pursuing its own order – a network of client states bound to Russia. In this way, it is not so different from the Soviet model for which Putin is so nostalgic. This may not seem like the basis of a very sustainable partnership. Prospects are bleak for economic growth and stability in each African country where Russia has gained influence. Moreover, there are bitter resentments toward Russia for actively subverting democratic transitions in places like Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Uganda, the DRC, and Zimbabwe. Public opinion surveys cited by Ramani indicate Putin and Russia are decidedly unpopular with ordinary African citizens. But under Russia’s elite co-option model, African public opinion doesn’t matter. From Moscow’s perspective, the disruption strategy is unfolding according to plan.
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CiteScore
1.60
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18.20%
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36
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