如果这是你应得的,那就是:最后通牒,用乐高

IF 5.1 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, APPLIED
A. Oliver
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引用次数: 1

摘要

开发最后通牒和独裁者游戏是为了帮助确定人类行为的基本动机,通常要求参与者与其他人分享意外之财。在最后通牒博弈中,一个常见的观察结果是,提议者提供而回应者拒绝接受的禀赋份额比理性选择理论预测的要大得多。然而,在现实世界中,意外之财是罕见的:钱通常是赚来的。我在这里报告了一项小型研究,旨在测试参与者在通过建造乐高模型或花一些时间按长度分类螺丝获得捐赠后,对最后通牒游戏的反应。我发现,提议者提供的份额和回应者接受的份额明显低于通常用意外之财观察到的份额,当获得捐赠的任务通常不那么令人愉快,因此可能更费力(例如,与乐高积木相比,螺旋分类)时,这种观察就会加剧。因此,我认为,对基于努力的回报的考虑往往是个人决策背后的重要驱动因素,而实验室实验如果旨在为公共政策的设计和实施提供信息,就应该反映人们所面临的现实的广泛特征。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
If you've earned it, you deserve it: ultimatums, with Lego
The ultimatum and dictator games were developed to help identify the fundamental motivators of human behavior, typically by asking participants to share windfall endowments with other persons. In the ultimatum game, a common observation is that proposers offer, and responders refuse to accept, a much larger share of the endowment than is predicted by rational choice theory. However, in the real world, windfalls are rare: money is usually earned. I report here a small study aimed at testing how participants react to an ultimatum game after they have earned their endowments by either building a Lego model or spending some time sorting out screws by their length. I find that the shares that proposers offer and responders accept are significantly lower than that typically observed with windfall money, an observation that is intensified when the task undertaken to earn the endowment is generally less enjoyable and thus perhaps more effortful (i.e., screw sorting compared to Lego building). I suggest, therefore, that considerations of effort-based desert are often important drivers behind individual decision-making, and that laboratory experiments, if intended to inform public policy design and implementation, ought to mirror the broad characteristics of the realities that people face.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.90
自引率
2.00%
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