困惑，理解和成功

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-02-16 DOI:10.1163/22105700-bja10051

Miloud Belkoniene

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考察了亚当·卡特提出的一种专门针对理解的怀疑论假说——困惑假说。在澄清了这一假设的性质和范围后，它讨论了卡特对其提出的挑战的偏爱的美德透视主义回答。有人认为，这个答案最终是不令人满意的，因为它无法解释受试者如何获得保证，即她对给定信息的掌握实际上是由于她认为可靠的能力。然后，提供了一个不同的答案，该答案依赖于理解中所涉及的具体把握的实践维度，并被证明可以避免美德透视主义所面临的问题。

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Confusion, Understanding and Success

The present paper examines a type of sceptical hypothesis put forward by Adam Carter that specifically targets understanding—the Confusion Hypothesis. After clarifying the nature and scope of that hypothesis, it discusses Carter’s favoured virtue perspectivist answer to the challenge it raises. It is argued that this answer is ultimately unsatisfying as it is unable to explain how a subject can obtain assurance that her grasp of a given body of information actually results from the competences she comes to appreciate as being reliable. A different answer that relies on the practical dimension of the specific grasp involved in understanding is then offered and is shown to avoid the problems faced by Virtue Perspectivism.

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来源期刊

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.