炫耀：单边政策制定中的承诺与风险

IF 1.5 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Quarterly Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2017-09-05 DOI:10.1561/100.00016144

Gleason Judd

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引用次数: 16

摘要

尽管宪法规定了制衡，但总统在美国拥有实质性的单方面决策权。我研究了选举问题如何鼓励官员行使这些权力，使用了一种正式的模式，在这种模式中，官员的单方面决策技能各不相同，选民也不知道。在广泛的条件下，不可取的单方面行动在均衡中是不可避免的。这种反常行为发生在现任总统单方面行动以炫耀决策技能时，即使单方面行动是低劣的政策。炫耀是由选举动机驱动的，因为单方面行动对连任很重要。我还描述了现任总统单方面采取均衡行动的条件，前提是它能改善选民福利。

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Showing Off: Promise and Peril in Unilateral Policymaking

Presidents have substantial unilateral policymaking powers in the United States despite constitutional provisions for checks and balances. I study how electoral concerns encourage officeholders to exercise these powers, using a formal model in which unilateral policymaking skill varies across officeholders and is unknown to voters. Undesirable unilateral action is unavoidable in equilibrium under broad conditions. This perverse behavior occurs when the incumbent acts unilaterally to show off policymaking skill even though unilateral action is inferior policy. Showing off is driven by electoral motivations and occurs because unilateral action is important for re-election. I also characterize conditions under which the incumbent acts unilaterally in equilibrium if and only if it improves voter welfare.

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来源期刊

Quarterly Journal of Political Science POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

3.50

自引率

5.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： In the last half-century, social scientists have engaged in a methodologically focused and substantively far-reaching mission to make the study of politics scientific. The mutually reinforcing components in this pursuit are the development of positive theories and the testing of their empirical implications. Although this paradigm has been associated with many advances in the understanding of politics, no leading journal of political science is dedicated primarily to the publication of positive political science.