公共治理与企业全要素生产率:来自中国准自然事件的证据

IF 1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Maoyong Cheng, Zhenjun Li
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文利用2009 - 2020年中国上市公司的数据,采用准自然事件即随机恶势力的消除,考察了以随机恶势力消除为代理的公共治理对企业全要素生产率的影响。我们的研究结果表明,消除GEs通过两个互补的渠道显著降低了企业TFP:环境不确定性的增加和保护伞的削弱。我们还发现,在国有企业和媒体关注度较低的企业中,GEs消除对企业TFP的影响更为突出。我们的主要结果通过了一系列鲁棒性和内生性检验。我们通过确定公司层面的证据,为监管机构提供明确的政策影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Public governance and firm total factor productivity: Evidence from a quasi-natural event in China

Employing a quasi-natural event, that is, gangdom and evil forces (GEs) elimination in China, we examine how public governance proxied by GEs elimination affects firm total factor productivity (TFP) using data on Chinese-listed firms between 2009 and 2020. Our findings show that GEs elimination significantly reduces firm TFP through two complementary channels: increase in environmental uncertainty and the weakening of the protective umbrella. We also reveal that the effects of GEs elimination on firm TFP are more prominent in SOEs and in firms exposed to weaker media attention. Our main results pass a series of robustness and endogeneity checks. We provide clear policy implications to regulators by identifying firm-level evidence.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
11.10%
发文量
32
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