强制执行和披露

IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Benedikt Franke , Dirk Simons
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如果没有足够的执行力,披露规定往往被视为无关紧要。然而,强制执行可能会对公司自愿披露信息的动机产生意想不到的影响。我们建立了一个模型来分析执法对公司强制性和自愿性披露行为的影响。该模型可以根据其参数适应不同的披露和执行制度,从随机信息禀赋下的自愿披露到惩罚性赔偿下的执行制度下的披露。在广义版本中,低价值公司在强制性披露规则下披露,中等价值公司不披露(有些是合法的,有些是非法的),高价值公司自愿披露。更强有力的执法确实增加了遵守规定的公司数量。然而,它也使自愿披露变得不那么有吸引力,从而导致整体透明度下降。尽管如此,更强有力的执法仍然会对资本市场产生积极影响,比如降低错误定价。当我们将披露监管内部化,即根据公司偏好确定规则时,存在一个独特的标准,即没有大多数人喜欢对监管进行边际改变,这增加了执行力度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Enforcement and disclosure

Absent sufficient enforcement, disclosure regulations are often seen as inconsequential. However, enforcement could have unintended effects on firms' incentives to disclose information voluntarily. We develop a model to analyze the impact of enforcement on firms' mandatory and voluntary disclosure behavior. The model can accommodate different disclosure and enforcement regimes depending on its parameters, ranging from voluntary disclosure under stochastic information endowment to disclosure under an enforcement regime with punitive damages. In the generalized version, low-value firms disclose under a mandatory disclosure rule, medium-value firms do not disclose (some legally, some illegally), and high-value firms disclose voluntarily. Stronger enforcement does indeed increase the number of firms complying with the regulation. However, it also crowds out voluntary disclosure by making separation less attractive, resulting in a decrease in transparency overall. Nevertheless, stronger enforcement does still lead to positive capital market effects, such as lower mispricing. When we endogenize disclosure regulation, i.e., determine the rule according to firms' preferences, there exists a unique standard where no majority prefers a marginal change to the regulation, and that increases in enforcement.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
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