绿色买卖:绿色产品的信号理论

IF 2.6 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Hyoshin Ki, Jeong-Yoo Kim
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引用次数: 6

摘要

在本文中,我们重新考虑消费者谁是关心环境的信息问题,这是由Mahenc, 2007年,Mahenc, 2008年首次确定。我们得到的结果是,直觉准则选择了唯一的均衡,在这种均衡中,生产生态友好产品的卖方通过将其价格从第一优价格向上扭曲到成本最低的程度,将自己与生产生态不友好产品的卖方分开。也就是说,价格高意味着环境友好。这与Mahenc(2007)的结果形成对比,他通过使用不败均衡的概念,将池化均衡作为唯一的结果(如果产品很可能是生态友好的)。本文还运用直觉准则检验了补贴政策对促进环保产品消费的效果。有趣的是,选择性补贴计划可以将高类型和低类型区分开来,但不能为卖方提供足够强的激励来投资环保技术。我们还表明,如果垄断者的动机,无论是单纯的利润最大化还是对环境的关注,都是其私人信息,高价可以表明垄断者对环境的关注和对环保技术的自愿选择。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Sell green and buy green: A signaling theory of green products

In this paper, we reconsider the information problem of consumers who are concerned about the environment that was first identified by Mahenc, 2007, Mahenc, 2008. We obtain the result that Intuitive Criterion selects the unique equilibrium in which a seller producing eco-friendly products separates itself from the seller producing eco-unfriendly products by distorting its price from its first-best price upwards to the least costly degree. That is, a high price signals environmental friendliness. This is contrasted with the result of Mahenc (2007) who obtains the pooling equilibrium as the unique outcome (if the product is very likely to be eco-friendly) by using the concept of the undefeated equilibrium. We also examine the effect of the subsidy policy to promote consumptions of environmentally-friendly products by using Intuitive Criterion. Interestingly, a selective subsidy scheme can separate the high type from the low type but cannot provide the seller a strong enough incentive to invest in the environmental-friendly technology. We also show that if the motive of the monopolist, whether it is solely profit-maximizing or involves concerns for the environment, is its private information, a high price can signal the monopolist's environmental concerns and its voluntary choice of the eco-friendly technology.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Resource and Energy Economics provides a forum for high level economic analysis of utilization and development of the earth natural resources. The subject matter encompasses questions of optimal production and consumption affecting energy, minerals, land, air and water, and includes analysis of firm and industry behavior, environmental issues and public policies. Implications for both developed and developing countries are of concern. The journal publishes high quality papers for an international audience. Innovative energy, resource and environmental analyses, including theoretical models and empirical studies are appropriate for publication in Resource and Energy Economics.
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