银行和主权风险传递:来自欧元区的证据

IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Aitor Erce
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引用次数: 1

摘要

主权和银行风险可以相互影响,引发不稳定的动态。在本文中,我使用欧元区国家的信用违约互换数据来研究是什么因素和冲击导致了银行与主权风险之间的相关性增强。主权风险传递(即主权不稳定会损害国内银行的健康)强于银行风险传递(即银行不稳定会损害主权的财政前景)。当银行对主权债务的敞口增加,或后者失去其投资级地位时,主权风险向银行的转移尤为强烈。在另一个方向上,如果银行规模较大,或者政府对其进行纾困,风险就会更强烈地从银行转移到主权国家。在救助期间,如果银行持有更多的国内主权债务,外债更多,或者主权债务存量更高,银行风险传递的可能性更大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bank and sovereign risk pass-through: Evidence from the euro area

Sovereign and bank risk can feed into each other and trigger destabilizing dynamics. In this paper, I use euro-area countries’ credit default swap data to study what factors and shocks underlie bouts of enhanced correlation between bank and sovereign risk. Sovereign risk pass-through, where sovereign instability undermines domestic banks’ health, is stronger than bank risk pass-through, where bank instability taints the sovereign's fiscal outlook. When banks are more exposed to the sovereign or the latter loses its investment-grade status, sovereign risk transfers to banks particularly strongly. In the other direction, risk transmits to the sovereign from banks more strongly if the banks are larger or if the government is bailing them out. During bailout periods, bank risk pass-through is more likely if banks hold more domestic sovereign debt, they are more externally indebted, or the sovereign debt stock is higher.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
8.30%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: International Finance is a highly selective ISI-accredited journal featuring literate and policy-relevant analysis in macroeconomics and finance. Specific areas of focus include: · Exchange rates · Monetary policy · Political economy · Financial markets · Corporate finance The journal''s readership extends well beyond academia into national treasuries and corporate treasuries, central banks and investment banks, and major international organizations. International Finance publishes lucid, policy-relevant writing in macroeconomics and finance backed by rigorous theory and empirical analysis. In addition to the core double-refereed articles, the journal publishes non-refereed themed book reviews by invited authors and commentary pieces by major policy figures. The editor delivers the vast majority of first-round decisions within three months.
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