莱布尼茨的归纳挑战

IF 0.3 0 PHILOSOPHY
Arnaud Pelletier
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引用次数: 2

摘要

莱布尼茨的形而上学通常被解释为完全基于理性,因此经验不会提供真正的基础,而只是对它的类比。针对这种解读,本文首先回顾,根据莱布尼茨,经验必然隐含在形而上学的指示性中,因为它们取代了我们无法解释的无限链的示范步骤。然后,它认为,他所说的两种“第一体验”——即“我思考”和“各种事情总是由我思考”——在证明Monadology的关键命题“存在物质”和“存在复合物”方面发挥了决定性作用。尽管莱布尼茨从未在这种情况下使用归纳一词,但这种——经常被忽视的——奇异的第一人称经验在把握普遍命题中的作用,在他的形而上学中构成了一个真正的归纳时刻。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Leibniz’s Inductive Challenge
Leibniz’s metaphysics is often interpreted as being based solely on reason, so that experience would not provide a true foundation but only an analogy to it. Against this reading, this article first recalls that, according to Leibniz, experiences are necessarily implied by the demonstrative nature of metaphysics, for they take the place of an infinite chain of demonstrative steps that we cannot explain. It then argues that what he calls the two “first experiences” – namely, that “I think” and “a variety of things are always thought by me” – play a decisive role in justifying the Monadology’s key propositions that “there are substances” and “there are composites”. Although Leibniz never uses the term induction in this context, this – often neglected – role of singular first-person experiences in the grasping of universal propositions constitutes a real inductive moment in his metaphysics.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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