少即是多:特许经营合同的二元观点

IF 7.4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Shiau-Ling Guo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

传统上,契约治理研究认为,交易风险对交易层面的契约设计具有相互影响。为了增进我们对组织间关系中的契约决策的理解,我将从传统上强调组织间关系的相互方面出发,研究如何暴露于特殊的交换风险可能会影响两分体中每一方的不同契约安排利益。将汇兑风险的发生地和合约设计视为二元的观点,拓宽了传统上对管理关系的附加观点的强调,进一步强调了如何有选择地排除合约权利可能是控制汇兑风险威胁的另一种方式。通过对美国136家餐饮特许经营系统的特许经营披露文件和合同的分析,笔者发现,当面临交易风险时,企业不仅可以通过增强自身利益的合同权利,还可以通过限制合同权利以有利于合作伙伴的方式加强自身保护。从二元视角出发,我的论文揭示了歧视性结盟原则,并对故意在合同中留下空白的战略含义产生了新的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When less may be more: A dyadic view of franchise contracts

Research on contractual governance has traditionally viewed exchange hazards as having mutual effects on contractual design at the transaction level. To advance our understanding of contracting decisions in interorganizational relationships, I depart from the traditional emphasis on the mutual aspects of interorganizational relationships by examining how exposure to idiosyncratic exchange hazards may impact the divergent contractual arrangement interests of each side of the dyad. Viewing the locus of exchange hazards and contract design as dyadic broadens the conventional emphasis on the add-on perspective of governing relationships to further emphasize how excluding contractual rights selectively may be an alternative way for controlling the threat of exchange hazards. Through an analysis of franchise disclosure documents and contracts for 136 restaurant franchise systems in the U.S., I found that, when confronted with exchange hazards, a firm can strengthen its own protection not only by enhancing contractual rights in its own interests but also by limiting contractual rights in favor of its partner. With a dyadic perspective, my paper sheds new light on the discriminating alignment principle and generates new insights into the strategic implications of intentionally leaving gaps in contracts.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
13.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: Long Range Planning (LRP) is an internationally renowned journal specializing in the field of strategic management. Since its establishment in 1968, the journal has consistently published original research, garnering a strong reputation among academics. LRP actively encourages the submission of articles that involve empirical research and theoretical perspectives, including studies that provide critical assessments and analysis of the current state of knowledge in crucial strategic areas. The primary user base of LRP primarily comprises individuals from academic backgrounds, with the journal playing a dual role within this community. Firstly, it serves as a platform for the dissemination of research findings among academic researchers. Secondly, it serves as a channel for the transmission of ideas that can be effectively utilized in educational settings. The articles published in LRP cater to a diverse audience, including practicing managers and students in professional programs. While some articles may focus on practical applications, others may primarily target academic researchers. LRP adopts an inclusive approach to empirical research, accepting studies that draw on various methodologies such as primary survey data, archival data, case studies, and recognized approaches to data collection.
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