{"title":"一个进退两难的原因是可加性","authors":"G. Keeling","doi":"10.1017/S026626712100033X","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$\\phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$\\phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally inadequate. The upshot of the dilemma is that one of the most influential accounts of how reasons accrue to determine what we ought to do is flawed.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A dilemma for reasons additivity\",\"authors\":\"G. Keeling\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S026626712100033X\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$\\\\phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$\\\\phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally inadequate. The upshot of the dilemma is that one of the most influential accounts of how reasons accrue to determine what we ought to do is flawed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51643,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics and Philosophy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics and Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S026626712100033X\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S026626712100033X","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$\phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$\phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally inadequate. The upshot of the dilemma is that one of the most influential accounts of how reasons accrue to determine what we ought to do is flawed.
期刊介绍:
The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.