统一和非统一税收/补贴制度下的多层定价

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Winston W. Chang, Tai-Liang Chen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了多层定价下垄断企业的最优具体税收/补贴政策。它表明,除其他事项外,对任何一级的特定税收的增加将增加(减少)非统一方案中前(后)一级的累积产出。相比之下,在统一方案下增加税收将减少所有阶层的产出及其累积产出。进一步,导出了最优策略轨迹,并证明了非均匀方案下最优分层率的不确定性。线性/非线性需求和二次成本的例子说明了许多有趣的特征。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Multi-tier pricing in uniform and non-uniform tax/subsidy systems

This paper examines the optimal specific tax/subsidy policy for a monopoly under multi-tier pricing. It shows, among other things, that an increase in a specific tax on any tier will raise (reduce) the cumulative output of preceding (succeeding) tiers in the non-uniform scheme. In contrast, increasing the tax under the uniform scheme will reduce the output for all tiers and their cumulative output. Furthermore, the paper derives the optimal policy locus and shows the indeterminacy of optimal tier rates in the non-uniform scheme. The case of linear/nonlinear demand and quadratic cost illuminates numerous interesting features.

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CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
34
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