{"title":"为堕胎辩护的责任争论:当一个人对胎儿的产生负有道德责任时。","authors":"Timothy Kirschenheiter","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2023.2261726","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I argue against responsibility arguments that offer a defence of abortion even on the assumption that the fetus is a person. I focus on argumentation originally offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson and then later defended by David Boonin. I offer thought experiments meant to show that, under certain conditions, one bears moral responsibility for creating a fetus. I then offer a positive argument for when one is morally responsible for the creation of a fetus. This argument relies on the presence of other forms of sex that reasonably approximate the goods of penile-vaginal intercourse. Given the presence of these options, sexual partners who engage in penile-vaginal intercourse bear moral responsibility for the creation of the fetus. While I do not think this argument settles the abortion debate - there still may be other ways to successfully defend abortion - it does explain why responsibility arguments like those offered by Thomson fail.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"340-351"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Responsibility Arguments in Defence of Abortion: When One is Morally Responsible for the Creation of a Fetus.\",\"authors\":\"Timothy Kirschenheiter\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/20502877.2023.2261726\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>I argue against responsibility arguments that offer a defence of abortion even on the assumption that the fetus is a person. I focus on argumentation originally offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson and then later defended by David Boonin. I offer thought experiments meant to show that, under certain conditions, one bears moral responsibility for creating a fetus. I then offer a positive argument for when one is morally responsible for the creation of a fetus. This argument relies on the presence of other forms of sex that reasonably approximate the goods of penile-vaginal intercourse. Given the presence of these options, sexual partners who engage in penile-vaginal intercourse bear moral responsibility for the creation of the fetus. While I do not think this argument settles the abortion debate - there still may be other ways to successfully defend abortion - it does explain why responsibility arguments like those offered by Thomson fail.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":43760,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"340-351\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2023.2261726\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2023/11/23 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2023.2261726","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2023/11/23 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Responsibility Arguments in Defence of Abortion: When One is Morally Responsible for the Creation of a Fetus.
I argue against responsibility arguments that offer a defence of abortion even on the assumption that the fetus is a person. I focus on argumentation originally offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson and then later defended by David Boonin. I offer thought experiments meant to show that, under certain conditions, one bears moral responsibility for creating a fetus. I then offer a positive argument for when one is morally responsible for the creation of a fetus. This argument relies on the presence of other forms of sex that reasonably approximate the goods of penile-vaginal intercourse. Given the presence of these options, sexual partners who engage in penile-vaginal intercourse bear moral responsibility for the creation of the fetus. While I do not think this argument settles the abortion debate - there still may be other ways to successfully defend abortion - it does explain why responsibility arguments like those offered by Thomson fail.