{"title":"第一人称否认精神病学中的数字表型和认识不公正。","authors":"Stephanie K Slack, Linda Barclay","doi":"10.1007/s11019-023-10174-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Digital phenotyping will potentially enable earlier detection and prediction of mental illness by monitoring human interaction with and through digital devices. Notwithstanding its promises, it is certain that a person's digital phenotype will at times be at odds with their first-person testimony of their psychological states. In this paper, we argue that there are features of digital phenotyping in the context of psychiatry which have the potential to exacerbate the tendency to dismiss patients' testimony and treatment preferences, which can be instances of epistemic injustice. We first explain what epistemic injustice is, and why it is argued to be an extensive problem in health and disability settings. We then explain why epistemic injustice is more likely to apply with even greater force in psychiatric contexts, and especially where digital phenotyping may be involved. Finally, we offer some tentative suggestions of how epistemic injustice can be minimised in digital psychiatry.</p>","PeriodicalId":47449,"journal":{"name":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"605-614"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10725846/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"First-person disavowals of digital phenotyping and epistemic injustice in psychiatry.\",\"authors\":\"Stephanie K Slack, Linda Barclay\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11019-023-10174-8\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Digital phenotyping will potentially enable earlier detection and prediction of mental illness by monitoring human interaction with and through digital devices. Notwithstanding its promises, it is certain that a person's digital phenotype will at times be at odds with their first-person testimony of their psychological states. In this paper, we argue that there are features of digital phenotyping in the context of psychiatry which have the potential to exacerbate the tendency to dismiss patients' testimony and treatment preferences, which can be instances of epistemic injustice. We first explain what epistemic injustice is, and why it is argued to be an extensive problem in health and disability settings. We then explain why epistemic injustice is more likely to apply with even greater force in psychiatric contexts, and especially where digital phenotyping may be involved. Finally, we offer some tentative suggestions of how epistemic injustice can be minimised in digital psychiatry.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47449,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"605-614\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10725846/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-023-10174-8\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2023/9/19 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Medicine Health Care and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-023-10174-8","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2023/9/19 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
First-person disavowals of digital phenotyping and epistemic injustice in psychiatry.
Digital phenotyping will potentially enable earlier detection and prediction of mental illness by monitoring human interaction with and through digital devices. Notwithstanding its promises, it is certain that a person's digital phenotype will at times be at odds with their first-person testimony of their psychological states. In this paper, we argue that there are features of digital phenotyping in the context of psychiatry which have the potential to exacerbate the tendency to dismiss patients' testimony and treatment preferences, which can be instances of epistemic injustice. We first explain what epistemic injustice is, and why it is argued to be an extensive problem in health and disability settings. We then explain why epistemic injustice is more likely to apply with even greater force in psychiatric contexts, and especially where digital phenotyping may be involved. Finally, we offer some tentative suggestions of how epistemic injustice can be minimised in digital psychiatry.
期刊介绍:
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy: A European Journal is the official journal of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care. It provides a forum for international exchange of research data, theories, reports and opinions in bioethics and philosophy of medicine. The journal promotes interdisciplinary studies, and stimulates philosophical analysis centered on a common object of reflection: health care, the human effort to deal with disease, illness, death as well as health, well-being and life. Particular attention is paid to developing contributions from all European countries, and to making accessible scientific work and reports on the practice of health care ethics, from all nations, cultures and language areas in Europe.